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Abstract
Project based organizational structures are utilized in many industries. The firms engaged
in these significant endeavors, project sponsor and contractor alike, risk both capital and
reputation in the market-place with each new project. Delivering projects effectively
provides all the firms involved with desirable financial outcomes and market advantage.
This thesis sets out to identify and understand the mechanisms established by the
contracting structure that in part determine the outcome of the project. It is suggested that
the nature of the relationship between project sponsor and contractor shapes the outcome
of the project to a significant extent. Complex and challenging projects are made more so
by the adversarial relationships that frequently exist between the sponsor and
contractor(s). This thesis unpacks the underlying mechanisms that determine that
relationship and begins to establish a theory of the project organization that could lead to
improved project execution performance.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Nelson Repenning
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1.0 Introduction
Project based organizational structures are utilized in many industries and exist on many
scales. At one end of the spectrum a "project team" may simply be a few individuals
within a firm assigned to solve a specific problem. At the other extreme a project can
involve thousand of individuals, employed by dozens of firms, spread across the globe,
acting together to deliver a particular outcome over the course of several years. Examples
of the second type of project are to be found in industries such as aerospace/defense (for
weapons system development, satellites, etc) and the energy sector for infrastructure
development (oil and gas pipelines, platforms, etc). These projects are often described as
Large Engineering Projects or LEPs.
One element that tends to characterize LEPs is their use of contractual relationships to
effect execution. While many small projects are executed by teams that exist within a
single firm, LEPs typically involve a number of firms being brought together by the
project sponsor to execute the project. At a minimum, there exists a separation between
the project sponsor and the contractor(s) selected to execute the project. This structure is
becoming more prevalent outside of the LEP sector as firms in a wide variety of
industries turn to "outsourcing" arrangements.
The management and delivery of LEPs in an effective manner, i.e. on schedule and
budget, is an extremely challenging endeavor. Failure to meet expectations tends to be
the rule rather than the exception (Miller and Lessard 2000). A great deal of effort, and
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research, has been invested in trying to understand how these systems work, with a view
to delivering better performance.
The core notion of this thesis is that formal contract relationships between sponsors and
contractors is a significant determinant of major project outcomes. The initial perceived
allocation of "rent" between participants in the endeavor shapes the ultimate performance
of the project. This notion is built upon the following premises:
1. Many systems being developed through major project structures (utilizing
contractors) are essentially integral systems (as compared to modular
architectures).
2. Integral systems require significant investment in integration activities
(communication, sharing of information, meetings, work sessions etc) in order to
be successfully developed.
3. Motivation for investing in integration activities is developed through
relationships between agents (firms, individuals) based on trust, mutual goals and
relational contracts (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2002).
4. The firms engaged in a project organization will act to create value (as they
perceive it) for their shareholders.
These four premises when taken together can lead to unexpected outcomes. The need,
and desire, to optimize rent allocation can lead to the use of formal contract mechanisms
which damage trust based relationship and undermine the investment in integration
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activities. This leads to sub-optimal project execution of complex integral systems. This
thesis builds a formal model that highlights the mechanisms described above.
1.1 Motivation
The search for the hydrocarbons that fuel the world's economy is taking place in ever
more challenging locations. Delivering oil and gas from the deepwater frontiers of the
Gulf of Mexico, West Africa and South America requires the use of sophisticated
technology and the deployment of significant economic and physical resources. The
global energy companies turn to engineering and service firms to provide the technology,
skills and assets, both human and material, required for delivering these major projects.
The integrated energy companies - owners and operators of the infrastructure - assemble
the project organization by, typically, competitively bidding and awarding contracts to
the engineering service providers (contractors).
Many of these projects are characterized by their enormous scale, complexity and high
level of novelty from a technology standpoint. Recovering hydrocarbons from reserves
found several miles beneath the ocean floor while drilling and managing the production
process from a platform located in thousands of feet of water, often hundreds of miles
from land, requires engineers to push the boundaries of technology. In an environment of
high technological risk and organizational complexity, delivering these major projects on
schedule and within budget is extremely challenging. The firms engaged in these
significant endeavors, project sponsor and contractor alike, put at risk both capital and
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reputation in the market-place with each project undertaken. Delivering these projects
effectively would provide all the firms involved with desirable financial outcomes and
market advantage relative to their competitors.
This thesis sets out to identify and understand the mechanisms established by the
contracting structure that in part determine the outcome of the project. It is suggested that
the nature of the relationship between project sponsor and contractor, founded as it is on a
process of competitive bid and contract award, shapes the outcome of the project to a
significant extent. Complex and challenging projects are made more so by the adversarial
relationships that frequently exist between the sponsor and contractor(s). This thesis
unpacks the underlying mechanisms that determine that relationship with a view to
delivering improved project execution performance.
1.2 Thesis Organization and Objectives
Understanding the drivers of project performance in the oil and gas sector requires at a
minimum the following. First, some level of familiarity with the business environment in
which the projects take place and second, an appreciation of the technological complexity
underlying these projects. Chapter two provides an introduction to both the business
environment and the technology constraints within which the projects are embedded. An
overview of the industry's recent performance in executing these projects is also
presented. Chapter three reviews literature relevant to the problems under investigation
and places this thesis in the context of that literature. Formal models of project and
16
product development efforts exist within system dynamics and this rich heritage is
explored. The literatures of contract theory, organizational behavior and product
development are introduced to provide the broad framework within which this thesis
resides.
Chapter four presents the key propositions that form this thesis: First, that the generation
of errors or "re-work" in complex systems projects is a function of the effort directed
towards integration activities. Second, that the investments firms and individuals make in
integration activities is a function of the strength of the relationship between the project
sponsor and contractor. Third, that the terms of the formal contract as determined a-priori
by the participants, shape the relationship between contractor and sponsor. Chapter five
presents a simple case study of a program of projects recently executed by an oil major.
In chapter six a formal model of a project is developed. This model explicitly captures the
sponsor-contractor relationship and its effects on project execution. Chapter seven
presents the results and analysis of this model. Finally, in chapter eight the following
conclusion is forwarded: that project sponsors need to award contracts that allow the
contractors to succeed. Approaching contract pricing and negotiation as a zero-sum game
is shown to result in higher than anticipated project costs under a wide rage of conditions
and that to deliver cost effective projects, contractors should be fairly rewarded for their
contribution. Finally, future avenues of research are suggested.
17
1.3 Approach and Methodology
The research in this thesis adopts the methodology of a case study and adds formal model
building. A case study of a recent program' of major projects undertaken by an integrated
energy company is conducted. A formal model is then developed that captures the
dynamics of project development and includes explicitly the relationship between project
sponsor and contractor.
1.3.1 Case Selection
The program of projects investigated was selected for the following reasons: First, as
former employee of one of the major contractors engaged on the projects, I came into the
study with a high degree of familiarity with the processes under investigation. Second,
my years of experience in this realm and with these specific projects allowed for an
accelerated appreciation and understanding of the challenges faced by senior project
management and their consequent mental models and assumptions. Interviews with these
individuals were made easier by my familiarity with the industry - I knew the secret
handshakes! Finally, the nature of this program of projects, I believed, made these
projects more susceptible to the dynamics under investigation in this thesis. Multiple
project contracts2 were used by the project sponsor to secure the capabilities and
resources of the engineering service providers (contractors) required to execute on the
1 A "program" refers to the development of an infrastructure network. It can consist of a number of projects
that are linked either through geography or utilization of shared resources.
2 Multiple project contracts exist when the project sponsor awards a contract to a service provider that
covers not just a single specific project, but rather a number of projects that are either conducted
concurrently or in sequence. This bundling or projects heightens the perception of "what's at stake" during
the contract negotiation.
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projects forming the program. The bundling of projects into single larger contracts
increased the financial implications for all parties involved in the bidding and award of
the contracts. The contract structures themselves could therefore be expected to have
received critical attention from all parties and thus represent the outcome of the firm's not
inconsiderable expertise in generating and executing such agreements.
1.3.2 Case Investigation
A series of interviews were conducted with senior managers responsible for elements of
each of the projects. The levels of management interviewed included Project General
Managers (those responsible for the performance of the overall project), Facilities
Managers (responsible for all of the physical systems being developed), Floating Systems
Managers (responsible for the hull and structure of the floating platform) and Topsides
Delivery Manager (responsible for the processing and accommodation structures mated
to the hull of the floating system). In all, thirteen formal interviews were conducted, with
a number of these being follow-up interviews, with nine key managers from the
integrated oil company (project sponsor).
In addition to the formal interviews, presentations of the research were made to different
sections of the sponsor's project community to promote further discussion and elicit new
information. The communities engaged included members of the project management
teams and representatives from the contract strategy development team. I was also able to
attend a number of workshops organized by the contract strategy team. In these
workshops a number of contracting strategies for engaging the engineering service
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providers were explored. Involvement in this process allowed for further understanding
of the assumptions held by the project sponsors. Finally, internal reports documenting
elements of a project's performance were made available for analysis. This data further
helps establish the way in which the project sponsor evaluates the performance of the
project and by default the performance of the contractors executing that project.
The data used for building the model, and conversations reflect the perspective of the
energy company management. Therefore there is no formal representation from the
contractor perspective, or from the functional levels of the project organization. This is
mitigated to some degree by my own experiences in these roles and unofficial
conversations with ex-colleagues.
1.3.3 A Formal Model
System dynamics was employed to build a formal model of the project structures being
investigated. System dynamics modeling has enjoyed widespread success in the
investigation and management of project and product development endeavors. The
acceptance of this technique, and its established utility in this realm, make it the natural
investigative tool. This thesis extends the traditional system dynamics project models by
explicitly capturing the boundary between project sponsor and contractor. Previous
examples have assumed that the project is enacted by an organization with singular
financial objectives. This model breaks with that assumption. The formal model and the
modeling process are described in detail in chapter six.
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2.0 The Oil & Gas Industry
The energy industry is the world's largest with a private sector annual turnover in excess
of $1.8 Trillion (measured in 2000)3. The global demand for marketed energy4 is
expected to increase from 404 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) in 2001 to over 623
quadrillion Btu in 2025 . (See Figure 1 below). This represents an increase in excess of
54%.
Figure 12. World Primary Energy Consumption,
1970-2G25
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Figure 1. Global Primary Energy Consumption
To satisfy this demand the International Energy Agency estimates that investment in
energy supply infrastructure between 2001 and 2030 is expected to top $16 trillion (in
2003 dollars)6. This investment is divided as shown in Figure 2 below.
3 "The slumbering giants awake?", The Economist Energy Survey, Feb 8th 2001, pg 6.
4 International Energy Outlook 2004 (IE02004),http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/world.html. The
projection for energy consumption is based only on marketable energy products
' Ibid.
6 World Energy Investment Outlook - 2003, ISBN 92-64-01906-5 (2003), pg 41.
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Figure 2. World Energy Investment (2001- 2030)
Note: E&D = Exploration and Development; T&D = Transmission and Distribution
As can be seen from Figure 2 above, oil and gas infrastructure investment alone accounts
for 38% of the total. The investment in exploration and development activities for oil, gas
and LNG (liquefied natural gas) will exceed $4.1 trillion over the period 2001 to 2030.
This investment will be implemented through development projects with all the
consequent risks of value erosion that result from poorly performing projects. A
significant percentage of this investment will target offshore infrastructure, especially the
deepwater fields. Any improvement in project execution in this environment results in
significant financial upside for all involved.
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2.1 Business Environment
2.1.1 Operators
To gain understanding of a key driver of corporate strategy in the oil and gas sector it is
essential to be aware of the distribution of the worlds proven hydrocarbon reserves. The
table below is drawn from the 2004 edition of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy
which provides a comprehensive analysis of the state of the global energy market.
World NON-OPEC** OECD OPEC Middle-East
Oil Reserves 1147.0 178.8.8 85.8 882.0 726.6
(Thousand Million BBL)
Gas Reserves 6204.9 N/A 546.5 N/A 2531.8
(Trillion Cubic Ft)
Oil Production 3697.0 1717.0 997.5 1466.9 1093.7
(Million Tonnes)
Gas Production 2356.6 N/A 983.7 N/A 231.9
(Million Tonnes Oil Equiv) 1
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries*
* Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates and Venezuela
** Excludes the Former Soviet Union states
Table 1: Global Oil and Gas Production, 2003
The integrated oil companies compete head to head in finding and producing
hydrocarbons, and in the downstream segment for refining and selling petroleum
products to the consumer. Each company invests heavily in technology in order to gain
competitive advantage. The cost of producing oil and gas, measured in $/boe (barrel of
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oil equivalent), is a determinant of the company's success in the market place as it
represents a significant portion of the fundamental underlying "cost-of-goods-sold".
Infrastructure development (LEPs) makes up a significant part of the cost of producing
the hydrocarbons, especially in the deepwater environment.
As can be seen from Table 1, the majority of the world's oil reserves are within the
OPEC countries with the lions share found in the middle-east. Oil production is much
more diverse however with nearly 50% of annual production taking place in non-OPEC
countries. This reflects the presence of the independent oil-majors in West Africa, the
Former Soviet Union, South East Asia, the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea. The quest
for new reserves to replace those currently in production is fundamental to ongoing
operations for the independent oil majors. The oil producers are very much aware of the
need to satisfy growing global demand for energy, and as such are investing heavily in
the search for new sources, beyond those required for replacement stocks. Wall Street in
particular pays close attention to the volume of proven reserves announced by the oil
majors as a reflection of future earning potential and viability. However their access to
many of worlds largest reserves is somewhat restricted (being either controlled by
National Oil Companies or located within politically troublesome states). As a result the
oil majors are turning to deepwater fields to satisfy the need for resources. Exploitation of
reserves located in the deep waters of the regions such as the Gulf of Mexico requires
massive investment in new infrastructure and a host of new technologies.
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2.1.2 Engineering Service Providers
The resources, both human and material, needed to design, engineer, fabricate and install
offshore oil and gas facilities are provided by the engineering service firms. These
organizations are typically engaged by the project sponsor through a process of
competitive bids. The service firms compete fiercely to win the contracts from the oil
companies and in recent years have struggled financially as they have been forced to
accept an increasing share of the project risk. The use of lump-sum EPIC (engineering,
procurement, installation & commissioning) contracts has been favored by the oil majors
as a mechanism to hold project costs down. At the same time the projects themselves
have become significantly more demanding in terms of the uncertainties involved, both
from a technology perspective and organizationally as the scale of the systems being built
became ever larger. The imbalance between the risks accepted and the firm's ability to
manage those risks has driven several close to bankruptcy and forced others to withdraw
from EPIC contracts. In the environment of a limited market place, both for the number
of client firms and the number of service firms, it is often the case that rival service firms
will be partnered on a project while simultaneously competing to win the lions share of
the next one. This very tight competitive environment forces firms to bid aggressively to
win work from the oil majors, who are attempting to drive down the costs of the multi-
billion dollar project investments they are making.
2.2 System Architecture
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The systems required to exploit hydrocarbons from the world's deep ocean basins are
very complex and they are required to carry out multiple functions:
" Drill the wells from which hydrocarbons are produced.
" Transport the well fluids in a safe and environmentally friendly way to the surface
facility.
" Clean and partially refine the produced fluids for transport to shore.
* Store and then distribute the hydrocarbons to shore.
" Re-inject produced gasses and water as required into the reservoir beneath the
ground.
* House and support the individuals required to operate the equipment and manage
the processes.
" Provide the control and communication systems required to control, measure,
direct, activate and respond to system changes.
" Achieve all of the above, while suspended on a man-made island located in over a
mile of water, hundreds of miles from land, in such a way that the system can
withstand the worst nature could throw at it in a 100 years. (The systems are
designed to withstand the statistically generated 100 year storm state)
Needless to say new projects cost multiple billions of dollars to bring on stream and in
the process require new technologies to be developed: new materials for the pipelines,
new welding processes, new drilling techniques, new architectural forms for the massive
floating structures required, new subsea components to be installed at depths of over a
mile, and new installation and fabrication techniques.
26
Figure 3. Examples of Platform Architectures
To develop these systems they are typically broken down into functional elements such
as:
* Hull & Mooring- the floating structure that supports the equipment.
" Topsides - the process facility and accommodation, controls systems and
potentially drilling system.
* Subsea - all the systems required to control the produced fluids from mudline to
the surface facility. This includes components such as risers, flowlines, control
and power umbilicals.
" Export - pipelines or offload system to transport the product to shore.
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Each of these system elements are often engineered by different contractors as befits the
technical specialization required. In addition each system's evolution from preliminary
design, to detail design, procurement, fabrication and installation may be divided
amongst different firms. For example, the hull may be designed by a firm in Sweden,
manufactured by a Korean shipbuilding company, transported to the US and mated with
the topsides by a US firm and finally installed offshore by another separate European
company. The integration of all these firms and systems is enormously complex as
evidenced by the following partial DSM.
1 2 314 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12113114115 16 17118119120121 22123124125126 27 28129130131132 33134135136137138 39140141142143 44 45146147148
01. Prepare Dvelmt Strategy & Fsiblty Study (Incl. 3rd Party Prod x
02. Gain Partner Approval on Development Options x x
03. Award Topsides and Proj. Eng. & Services Contract X x
04. Prepare Well Fluids Data, GOR and Production Profile x x
05. Conceptual rig engineering x -x
06. Conceptual topsides engineering Xxx x 1 -
07. Conceptual hull and mooring engineering x x X
08. Prepare Operations and Maintenance Philosophy x x
09. Prepare Ini. Subsurface Development Plan & drilling progra x
10. Gain Partner Approval on Concept Select Decision x x
11. Offshore Installation Contract Strategy and Award x x xx
12. Award hull and mooring design and fabrication contract I x
13. Conceptual riser and well systems engineering x x x a
14. Compile DSP for Select/Define Gate x X a
15. PHSER - Stage I X-fp
16. Generation of Site Specific Environmental Data x3 2
17. Generation of Site Specific Geotechnical Data x3 2 1
18. Develop Reservoir Management Strategy
19. Prepare POD X x x SMEMM M
20. Preliminary rig engineering X X X I x X
21. Prepare Operations Staffing Plan X X X X X X
22. Develop Preliminary Topsides Engineering x
23. Develop preliminary riser and well systems engineering x x x - x X- _
24. Preliminary hull and mooring engineering x x
25. Preliminary Drilling Program and Operations X X x
26. Prepare Project Design Basis Document X X X x x X
27. Complete Pre-Sanction Review and Sanction Project X xVAO
28. Select PRT combo, riser design
29. Gain partner approval on POD
30. Fire and blast and topsides HAZOP study
31. Revise hull fabrication contract
32. Acquire Additional 3-D Seismic Data and Process x
33. PHSER - Stage I X
34. Subsurface Development Optimization X X
35. Detailed Topsides Engineering Design (31,38-42) -- - - - -- X X*
36. Complete Well Design and Sea Floor Pattern (well layout) X x x-- - ----. x
37. Compile DSP for Define / Execute Gate X X X X
38. Topsides Equipment Procurement
39. Pre-Drill 6 Wells X x
40. Hire and Train Staff for Operations x x
41. Detailed Rig Design _ x
42. Detailed hull and mooring engineering 7x+
43. Perform Global Riser Analysis X X x X
44. Perform Detailed PRT, Riser and Wellhead Engineering X X x-x-x-- -_ a
45. Submittal and Approval of Preliminary DWOP X x I X
46. Issue fabrication engineering drawings 
_ _ _ _
Figure 4. Oil and Gas Project Design Structure Matrix
Despite the "modularity" of contracting structure, the system itself is highly integral in
nature being required to transfer and control vast amounts of mass and energy (Whitney,
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2004), (the hydrocarbons may be produced from the wells at pressures between 10,000
psi and 15,000 psi and at temperatures exceeding 200 Deg F). For example, the design of
the riser system (the pipes that are suspended from the floating platform that transport
hydrocarbons from the seabed to the facility) requires design interfaces with the
following systems:
" The hull - where the risers are placed affects the motion characteristics of the hull
and the internal stress carrying requirements.
" The hull piping design - the interface with the piping determines the amount of
thermal expansion allowance required, the loads placed on the hull piping and the
dimensions of the hull piping (to match annulus dimensions for fluid flow
characteristics).
" The flow assurance system - the control of the thermal properties and fluid
dynamics of the product in the pipes (at certain temperatures and pressures the
product can freeze due to entrapped water and block the system).
" The testing and controls system - all pipes are monitored for stress levels and
performance to control for fatigue of the pipes.
" Fabrication and installation procedures and equipment - the design of the riser
determines the capacity of the vessels required to fabricate and install the piping.
This can then be a limiting factor on the riser design.
The list above is not, be any means, exhaustive. The operational aspects, maintenance,
subsea design, architecture of well layouts, topsides design, testing requirements and
many other elements are all related to the design and layout of this one system element.
Obviously the development of such complex systems, with component counts exceeding
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those of commercial airliners by orders of magnitude, is enormously challenging. In the
next section I explore the industry's success in delivering the systems described above.
2.3 Industry Performance
The track record of the oil and gas industry with respect to delivering major projects on
schedule and budget has been disappointing. For example, a recent article reviewed a
study of fourteen mega-projects (Merrow 2003) - eleven of them offshore developments -
executed by the industry in the last 20 years. The outcomes of the survey were
remarkable. The average cost growth was 46% over the authorization estimate, with half
the sample exceeding 40% cost growth. The total value of this cost creep was $11.8
billion. Schedules also slipped by an average of 28%, with the seven worst projects -
classified by the report as "dogs" 7 - slipping an astounding 39%. The report concluded
that:
"Despite another 20 years of experience with large projects, you can't help but conclude
that we have seen no material progress in the control of very large developments. The
problematic projects here are reminiscent of many of the worst early North Sea
developments...
... half of the projects must be described asfailuresfrom both a project management and
business perspective."8
It is also significant to note that the report indicated that:
7 "Dogs" were those projects that had experienced cost growth exceeding 40%. These dogs were fully half
the sample investigated.
8 Merrow E., 2003, pp 9 1
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"...facilities rather than well construction are the primary source of cost growth on the
mega- projects."9
This is an important observation in that traditionally well construction has been perceived
as an inherently risky activity due to the uncertainty of the drilling process. Managing
complex facility development, design and construction processes however actually
appears as the dominant area of risk.
Reviews from within the industry are not the only reference point for believing that the
industry is doing a poor job of managing these complex projects. The investment
community has also made its judgment. A recent equity research note issued by a Wall
Street firm stated that they (the firm) would no longer offer specific coverage of the
offshore construction/field development sector and offered the following rationale 0 :
"For several years, the industry has faced a difficult environment with excess capacity,
irrational bidding practices on some fronts, poor project execution, generally unhealthy
contractual terms, the building up of large outstanding claims, and signficant order
delays. We believe that these factors have reduced the justification for covering the
offshore construction /field development niche as a dedicated sector."
This is not a singular assessment with other Wall Street investment firms echoing the
sentiment:
"Several structural issues in the sector have contributed to poor financial results over the
last two years. The dominant negotiating position held by the major integrated oil
companies, excess industry capacity and poor discipline exercised by several contractors
9 Merrow E., 2003, pp 91.
1 Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. Members New York Stock Exchange Inc, equity research note issued
November 14th 2003.
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resulted in high-risk and unprofitable contracts that have plagued offshore construction
companies. "
"...the industry must address the risk/reward equation associated with large EPIC
(engineering, procurement, installation and commissioning) contracts. Several
companies have already changed policies to avoid EPIC contracts or to limit the risks
involved with contract terms. The willingness of major oil companies and the discipline
of the construction industry participants as a whole to commit to structural changes in
contracting could substantially lower the risk and volatility in earnings for the group."
The project sponsors are not unaware of these issues and have ample evidence that many
projects perform poorly. Consider the following chart created from data provided by an
integrated oil company of an actual oil pipeline construction project.
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Figure 5. Oil Pipeline Construction - Labor Hours per Month
"Jeffries & Company Inc, Equity Research, Oil Services Group, Offshore Construction: Riding Out the
Turbulent Seas, July 2003.
" Ibid.
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Figure 6. Oil Pipeline Construction - Construction Progress by Month
While the data presented above appears to represent an extreme worst case, the report
quoted at the start of this chapter, and the assessment by Wall Street of the project
execution industry seems to suggest that charts like the ones above are all too prevalent.
The question therefore needs to be asked: what is driving the poor performance of these
projects (and thus the poor financial performance of the firms engaged), and what can the
industry do to improve project execution? The next chapter reviews the literature that
provides the framework in which we can craft a response to that challenging question.
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3.0 Background and Literature (Foundation)
Project organizations are a feature of many industries, from energy, aerospace,
shipbuilding and automotive to software and telecommunications. In all of these settings
projects create challenges for the managers responsible for them, and for the
organizations that execute them. These challenges manifest themselves in multiple
aspects of the project, from project financing, the motivation of staff, management of
product development processes to the design of appropriate metrics and incentive
systems. Consequently the study of project based organizations, and the mechanisms that
drive project performance in general, has generated a rich literature that cuts across a
number of academic disciplines including organizational theory, economics, product
development and system dynamics. This thesis draws upon aspects of that literature. In
this chapter I will present an overview of some of these knowledge domains and establish
the linkage between the existent theories in the appropriate knowledge area and the
assumptions outlined in chapter one.
This thesis limits its investigation to projects which feature product systems that are
essentially integral architectures. Integral systems are those that are "designed with the
highest possible performance in mind"'3 and where "modifications to any one particular
component or feature may require extensive redesign". In this sense the systems under
investigation in this thesis are definitively integral. Other definitions of integral
architecture have been offered that relate to the decomposability of the system by
13 Ulrich K, T., Eppinger S, D., 2000, pg 184.
14 Ibid.
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function: in integral architectures functions are spread across components resulting in
more complex interfaces (Sosa, Eppinger and Rowles, 2000). This definition is familiar
for categorizing systems by considering components within the system. In addition
systems can be defined by how they share interfaces with other systems that form the
product architecture; an external view of systems architecture (Sosa, Eppinger and
Rowles, 2003). In this external view "integrative systems are those whose design
interfaces span all or most of the systems that comprise the product due to their
physically distributed or functionally integrative nature throughout the product." 15 Even
momentary consideration of the design of offshore platforms and field developments
would lead to their being characterized as integrative architectures, as the description in
the preceding chapter shows. A further, and critical, determinant of systems architecture
is provided by a consideration of system requirements from a mass and power
transportation view. Whitney (2004) suggests that certain physical systems, typically
mechanical ones that carry significant power, are constrained from utilizing modular
architectures. The systems under development by the projects investigated here certainly
qualify as mechanical systems carrying significant power.
The integral nature of the systems under development has important implications on the
development process. As Novak points out "the more interconnected are the parts of a
system, the more difficult it is to coordinate development"' 6 . Communication between,
and within teams, is essential for the successful development of complex systems.
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) have emphasized the importance of communication with
15 Sosa M, E., Eppinger S, D., Rowles C, M., 2003, pp 240.
16 Novak s., Eppinger S, D., 2001, pp 190.
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respect to improved project performance. As stated by Eppinger; "To assure that the
entire system works together, the many sub-system development teams must work
together".' 7 Communication and information sharing is central to the development of
complex systems, "team members deal with imprecise information and so must
communicate to define problems or to reach consensus on the solution of a problem".' 8 A
number of elements are needed in support of fostering communication. Group
cohesiveness has been described as factor in determining project outcomes. Keller (1986)
noted that "cohesive project groups were able to achieve high project quality and able to
meet their goals on budgets and schedules."1 9 The literature thus certainly supports the
notion that successful projects require significant investment in integration activities as
stated in chapter one. It is therefore necessary to ask; what are the requirements for
establishing this investment?
Generating cohesive teams requires interpersonal and inter-organizational trust. As noted
by McAllister (1995), "researchers have argued that efficiency within complex systems
of coordinated action is only possible when inter-dependent actors work together
effectively. Trust between such actors is seen as a determining factor."2 0 Investigations
into the phenomena of virtual and distributed teams have also noted the importance of
trust in generating the communication that is vital'for project success. A recent study by
McDonough III et al, (2001) into the use of globally distributed product development
teams noted that "low levels of trust can have detrimental affects on the quality of
17 Eppinger S, D., 1997, pp 199.
18 Sosa M, E., Eppinger S, D., Pich M, McKendrick D, G., Stout S, K., 2002, pp 46.
19 Keller R, T., 1986, pp 723.
20 McAllister D., 1995, pp 24.
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communication and interpersonal relationships." 2' Trust becomes particularly important
as a function of complexity. McAllister references Thompson (1967) in observing that
"under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, requiring mutual adjustment, sustained
effective coordinated action is only possible where there is mutual confidence or trust."22
Two principle forms of trust can be described: cognition based trust, grounded in
individual assessments in relation to peer reliability and dependability, and affect based
trust, grounded in notions of reciprocity founded by personal care and concern
(McAllister 1995). These two forms of trust are highly coupled however and share the
common attributes of reliability and dependability. Examples of these attributes can be
interpreted as either expressions of effect based trust or as instances developing cognitive
trust. In either case "reliability and dependability expectations must usually be met for
trust based relationship to exist and develop, and evidence to the contrary provides a
rational basis for withholding trust."23 A Contractor falling behind schedule, or increasing
the cost of a project through variation orders, can be interpreted as failing to meet the
expectations of the project sponsor.
Trust as an attribute of organizational behavior is akin to the notion of relational
contracts; informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy 2002). As noted by Baker et al (2002), "A relational contract thus
allows the parties to utilize their detailed knowledge of their specific situation and to
adapt to new information as it becomes available". The importance of relational contracts
21 McDonough III E, F., Kahn K, B., Barczak G., 2001, pp 112.
22 McAllister D., 1995, 25.
2 lbid, pg 26.
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in the project environment is obvious. Of course, it is the formal contracts that establish
the framework in which the relational contracts exist. In discussing non-traditional
organizational forms such as joint ventures, alliances and virtual organizations Baker et al
(2002) argued that "informal aspects, especially relational contracts, are important to the
success of these non-traditional organizational forms. We also suspect that the formal and
informal aspects not only co-exist but also interact, creating another opportunity to
choose the former to facilitate the latter". This interaction was more forcefully argued
by Gibbons (2002) in suggesting that firms explicitly use formal and relational contracts
in tandem to achieve their desired outcomes in managing inter-firm relations.
In relationships between firms which use both informal (i.e relational) and formal
contracts, the shift from the former to the latter indicates that the value of the future
relationship is being re-evaluated. Reneging on the relational contract in favor of
invoking the formal suggests that the value of the future relationship is less than the value
of the immediate returns available from the formalized process. An example of this
transition would be invoking the use of variation orders to manage changes within a
project, in contrast to accommodating the change in a process of informal quidpro quo.
This indicates a removal of trust with clear consequences on the willingness of parties to
invest in trust based activities such as communication.
The field of system dynamics has been particularly engaged with trying to understand
project behaviors. The nature of large scale projects, defined as they are by highly
24 Baker, G., Gibbons, R., Murphy, K, J., 2002, pg 71
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nonlinear relationships between components, multiple feedback processes and dynamic
environments, makes system dynamics a particularly apt approach (Sterman 1992).
The persistence of poor project performance, despite the attention lavished on it, is often
cited (e.g Ford and Sterman 1998, Ford and Sterman 2002, Lyneis, Cooper and Els
2001). A number of areas have been identified as causes for disappointing project
performance:
" Lack of adequate front end loading.25
- Unrealistic schedules.
- Staffing. Either inadequate or poorly timed (i.e Brook's Law).
- Over use of overtime.
- Poor governance (Miller and Lessard 2000).
- Poor processes. (i.e a lack of clearly defined requirements, reviews, metrics)
The system dynamics approach to understanding project pathologies has focused on
understanding the structure of projects that lead to schedule delays and cost overruns. The
idea of the rework cycle is fundamental to this approach (e.g Cooper 1980, Abdell-Hamid
1991, Repenning 2001, Ford and Sterman 1998, 2002). A number of assumptions have
characterized the systems dynamics models: First, that the tasks carried out by the
organization are essentially homogenous, or are grouped into a few distinct categories.
Essentially though, each task is not generally differentiable in terms of complexity, time
to completion and skills required. This is clearly not true in real world projects, but at the
25 Front end loading refers to the process of investing early in the project in activities that allow for areas of
uncertainty to be adequately investigated and defined.
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aggregate scale required for understanding the effects of delays, feedbacks and policy
decisions the distinction proves generally unimportant. Second, the project organization
was housed "under one roof'. This is not to say that management was not distinct from
staff engineers, or that there are not distinct phases of activities in a project (Ford and
Sterman 2002, Black and Repenning 2001, Repenning 2001). Indeed a key behavior of
the projects under investigation in the system dynamics literature has related to the
impact of allocation of resources to different phases of the project. Rather the assumption
of "under one roof' relates to the notion that the project model is contained within the
boundary of one firm or enterprise. Divergent financial incentives between actors
engaged in project execution have not been explicitly included previously.
The next chapter brings together the ideas explored above in the literature review. The
dynamic interactions between the integral nature of the product system, the consequential
need for investment in integration activities and the structural determinants of inter-
organizational trust will be elaborated on. A simple causal loop model of the
interconnections between these elements will be presented in a prelude to developing the
formal system dynamics model in chapter six.
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4.0 Why projects have problems.
It is important to recall an assumption stated in the introduction: the firms will act to
create value (as they perceive it) for their shareholders. For the contractors the creation of
value is achieved through a variety of contractual mechanisms. The first is the agreed
rates or lump sum value of the project. The project sponsor and contractors agree a price
for provision of services, the scope of services being set out in the contract documents. A
second mechanism for deriving value from the contract is the use of variation orders,
sometimes known as change orders. This mechanism is provided in contracts as, for all
but the most trivial of projects, there is uncertainty surrounding the scope. This
mechanism allows for changes to be made to the contract scope and additional costs
calculated. Contractors are able to use these mechanisms to generate additional revenue
from the project. In very large and complex projects there usually exists a certain
unavoidable amount of ambiguity to the contractual terms. It is almost received wisdom
amongst project sponsors that the contractors use variation orders as a primary source of
revenue. The third mechanism of value creation is developing a relationship that leads to
future work (relational contracts). This is often paid lip service to, but it is extremely hard
to quantify the value of these relationships when the project sponsors almost always use
competitive bids to select contractors. The variation order revenue mechanism can be
described by the causal loop below.
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Overall Desired
Revenue
Revenue from Performance
Variation Orders
Contractors Marginal
+ Return On Project
Pressure To
Contract B Secure Revenue
V~ariaition Orders
+ Contractor Revenue
Pressure Loop
Pressure to Use Contract
Mechanisms to raise
Revenue
Figure 7. Variation Order - Revenue Loop
The loop above captures the contractor's use of variation orders to derive revenue on a
particular project. When a gap exists between the desired financial performance for the
firm and the return achieved on a specific project this leads to pressure to secure revenue
on that project. This in turn leads to pressure to use contract mechanisms to raise revenue.
The use of variations orders (VOs) consequently increases. As VOs increase revenue is
generated from the project. This helps to close the gap between expected and delivered
performance. A balancing loop is the consequence. Of course, the use of variation orders
does not just deliver revenue. Other consequences exist.
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Integration
activities Early Discovery of
Potential
Problems/Changes
Communication
with contractor R
+ Contract
NVa1i1 ation Orde rs
Variation Order -
Communication Loop
Strength of Working Satisfaction with
Relationship Contractor
(Relationship Index) Pra
+ Pe rfo rma nee
Figure 8. Variation Order - Communication Loop
The causal loop shown above indicates the interaction between communication,
integration and variation orders. Variation orders represent additional costs for the project
sponsor and, when used, are likely to reduce the level of satisfaction the sponsor has with
the contractor's performance. This is easy to understand if we recognize that the
sponsor's managers are typically assessed by their ability to deliver a project on budget.
Variation orders usually hamper that ability. Satisfaction with the contractor's
performance is correlated with the strength of the working relationship that exists
between the contractor(s) and the sponsor. As discussed in Chapter 3 the use of formal
contract mechanisms (VOs) indicate a shift away from a relational contract form. As the
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relationship between the contractor and sponsor is damaged by the VOs, the incentive to
invest in trust based processes such as communication is diminished.
A necessary consequence of reduced communication is reduced investment in integration
activities (meetings, design reviews etc). In highly integral architectures a reduction in
these activities leads to an increase in errors as fewer of the complex interactions between
sub-systems are validated amongst the sponsor-contractor design teams. Finding the
sources of variations (rework errors) earlier allows for the reduction in variation orders.
As can be seen from the reinforcing loop described above, a consequence of using
variation orders is a damaged relationship between project teams, reduced
communication and integration activities and hence more of the errors that create
variation orders! Variation orders become a link between the need to secure revenue and
a damaged relationship between project sponsor and contractor.
Overail Desired
Revenue
Integration Revenue from Pereonnce
activities Early Discovery of Variation Orders
Potential +
Problems/Changes
Contractors Marginal
Communication + Return On Project
rith contractor Pressure To
R Cotact B Secure Revenue
Variation Orde n>
Variation Order - + Contractor Revenue
Communication Loop Pressure Loop
Strength of Working Satisfaction with
RelationshipSaifconrt
(Relatioship Index) Contractor Pressure to Use ContractPerformance Mechanisms to raise
Revenue
Figure 9. Variation Orders: A Linking Mechanism
10-oo-M,
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Variation orders don't just impact the time devoted to integration activities via their
effect on the sponsor/contractor relationship. Variation orders also generate additional
work, or tasks, for the project team. Each variation order, at a minimum, requires the
development of documentation to support the claim, auditing, tracking, attendance of
meetings to resolve discrepancies, meetings to determine anticipated costs and impacts on
the project schedule and budget, in addition to actually carrying out the project tasks that
are identified in the VO. Thus the variation orders also impact the performance of the
project by generating additional tasks and additional resource pressures on the project.
This is illustrated below:
Overall Desired
Revenue
Integration Revenue from Perfonnance
activities Early Discovery of Variation Orders
Potential +
Problems/Changes
Contractors Marginal
Communication + Return On Project
,with contractor Pressure To
R Contmct Secure Revenue
Var- atort Ortders
Variation Order - + Contractor Revenue
Conmmunication Loop Pressure Loop
Effort Direcetc d to
Project Execution Strength of Working Satisfaction withActivities Relationship Contractor Pressure to Use Contract(Relationship Indexj Performance Mechanisms to raise
Revenue
Variation Order -
Effort Loop
Effort Directed to
Managing Variation
Orders
Figure 10. Variation Order - Effort Loop
As discussed above, variation orders required effort to develop and manage. This work
takes time and effort away from the tasks that make up the original project scope. More
work means less resources (time, people) are available to invest in time consuming
- -,- -- 7
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activities such as the critical integration processes. The consequence of that remains as
described earlier. Here again we see that the use of variation orders in fact leads to, again,
more errors and more variation orders. Now we can see two reinforcing loops acting in
concert as a consequence. However, the impact of variation orders does not end here.
The variation orders generate tasks that require resources. This is made clear above. The
outcome of that is that the existing resources get spread more thinly and integration
activities suffer. A further consequence is that pressure builds to service this additional
work load through the acquisition of additional resources. From the contractor's
perspective the ability to staff the project has been determined, in part, by the terms
(profit margins, value of the bid etc) agreed for the original contract. Bringing more
personnel onto the project requires a budget to support that action. This can lead to
additional pressure on the project to deliver revenue to help pay for the additional
resources the variation orders generated. This mechanism is particularly apparent when
the contractor is already resource constrained. In this environment the contractor will
look to hire non-staff engineers (confusingly called contractors by the industry) to
supplement their staff. These day-rate staff, (as I will term them) are typically more
expensive than full time staff employees (for a number of reasons I will not explore in
this thesis). The additional cost of expensive staff places pressure on the project to use
variation orders to secure revenue. Another reinforcing loop exists.
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Figure 11. Variation Order - Resources Loop
It is clear that once we put all of these feedback structures together that the decision to
use variation orders has a number of consequences for the execution of the project. What
we need to develop is some appreciation for the scale of these consequences. We would
like to be able to represent and quantify, to a first order, the impact of the decision to use
variation orders. It is also necessary to see how in a given project structure the use of
variation orders is shaped by elements of the project such as schedule pressure, returns on
the project and the strength of the relationship. It is also necessary to understand the
drivers of variation use in the first place and to see how the use of alternative policies by
the project sponsor could mitigate their use. A formal model of the system shown below
is developed in chapter six to explore the questions just enunciated.
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Figure 12. Variation Order Feedback Mechanisms
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5.0 Project Case Study
Large oil and gas projects evolve over several years and the "Milton" development, the
basis of the case study, was no exception. This project was one of a number of field
developments that were being executed by the project sponsor, "Big Oil Corp". The
other major projects were "Lumbergh", a North Sea project "Swingline" and a West
African project "Samir". Each represented significant investment, and risk, for the project
sponsor and the engineering contractors engaged on the project.
5.1 Program Strategy: Milton, Swingline, Lumbergh and Samir
Toward the early 1990's "Big Oil Corp" had a portfolio of promising oil and gas fields
located across the globe that they wished to develop. It was anticipated that developing
these projects would involve the commitment of a significant portion of the industry's
capabilities. In several niche technology and service areas (such as offshore installation,
pipe manufacturing, and shipyards) a shortage of the assets required to execute the
projects was identified and a contracting strategy to mitigate these pinch points was
developed. In an effort to secure access to the human and physical resources needed, "Big
Oil" developed a "program" contract strategy. This approach awarded contracts to the
engineering service providers not for each project, but for the portfolio of projects. Each
project within the program was a major investment requiring sustained effort over
multiple years, and the program strategy represented a departure from the industry norm.
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The strategy appeared to offer a couple of advantages over a traditional approach. First,
the program guaranteed supply of the services that were required for the projects. Second,
in return for delivering a guaranteed stream of work for the contractors over multiple
years the engineering firms would reduce the cost of their services. It was expected that
these savings would be made possible by the repetition of key design elements amongst
the projects and hence create learning curves for both the sponsor and contractor teams.
As one senior manager involved with the development of this approach put it, the firm
would approach the set of projects:
"rather than a series of one offprojects ...aggregate volume, drive for economies of scale
and this lets us have an agenda around standardization"
As we shall see, the reality unfolded somewhat differently than was anticipated. In fact
the implementation of the program strategy may have contributed to a number of
problems that the projects experienced. To simplify the case study a little, just one of the
projects will be focused on. The chart below lays out some critical events related to the
Milton development.
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Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Q1 02 Q3 Q4 Q1 02 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 01 Q2 Q3 Q4
am Strategy Decided
> Exploration Business Unit hands over Milton to the development team for appraisal
>Program contracts awarded (Milton facility to be one of four)
> Design of Milton commencesi
> Development strategy shifted to parallel execution of Milton, Swingline and Lumbergh.
Sanctioned (15th Month) I
> Topsides fabrication shifted from South East Asia to Europe
> Fabrication of Topsides in Europe Commences
> Topsides sails from Europe to Gulf of Mexico
> Hull and Topsides structure mated
> Installation offshore commences (57th Month)
ENoil (Q1)
Figure 13. Timeline of Milton Topsides Contract and Project Execution
While one view was that economies of scale, and repeatable work, was enough to help
lower the cost of the projects, another view was that the scale of the work enabled Big Oil
to take a strong bargaining position in the market place. The portfolio of projects, when
offered into the market as a single package, represented a significant portion of the
available work for the contractors. They could ill afford to not pursue the work
vigorously. From Big Oil's perspective the use of scale to create bargaining leverage was
justified by the recognition that, as stated by one facility manager, "there are a lot of
people in this company that think that contractors are trying to rob us blind".
In the fourth quarter of Year 1 the first program contracts were awarded to key
contractors. These were established despite the fact that very little preliminary design had
taken place, indeed, even before projects (such as Milton) had even been officially
sanctioned. The contracts were established based on "generic" engineering designs. At
the time this was a crucial step in the contract strategy of securing the required resources.
It was known that other major integrated oil and gas firms were planning significant
projects and thus Big Oil decided to move fast on the contract strategy before their
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competitors tied up available resources. Front end loading was sacrificed in order to
achieve the required outcome. In retrospect many senior managers now believe that this
decision was a significant contributor to the later problems faced by many of the projects,
particularly Milton and the North Sea development Swingline. All the projects faced
numerous changes to their designs late in the development cycle and carried the costs of
the resulting variation orders.
The contracting approach had been, in part, predicated on the notion that the execution of
the developments would follow a pattern of "design one and build four" or as one
manager put it: "we were going to be like Henry Ford and build the same type offacility
four times ". However, by the second quarter of Year 2 the corporate drivers for the
program of projects had changed. Executive management at Big Oil determined that the
schedule for the projects should be compressed from a sequenced approach to a parallel
one. This was driven by the Board of Big Oil wanting to firstly signal Wall Street
investors that the firm was committed to developing these fields at a "best-in-class" pace,
and secondly, to fill what they perceived as a potential gap in the firm's reserves and
production profile towards the middle of the decade. This required a fundamental shift in
the contracting approach, best summed up by one project manager as: " a complete
change in strategy from sequenced to let's do 'em all at once ". This also precipitated
pressure to move the individual projects forward and "rush to sanction before we were
ready because of artificially induced deadlines".
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Design work on Milton commenced early in Year 2, shortly after the program contracts
were awarded and before the change in contract schedule was announced. It wasn't until
the third quarter of Year 2 that Milton was officially sanctioned. At about this time the
project teams for Samir and Lumbergh, each under pressure to accelerate development
schedules, and having commenced preliminary design work, recognized that the
extraction of hydrocarbons from their fields required fundamentally different facilities to
that needed for Milton and Swingline. The system architecture of the platforms and
subsea systems needed to change.
The contractors were now facing not one coordinated program of similar projects but
essentially four competing unique projects. Consequently the existing contracting
framework and working relationships came under pressure and problems began to
materialize. The contractors had "given Big Oil a 'discount' on additionalfacilities " with
an expectation of repeatability, which was now a diminishing possibility. In addition the
contractors were placed in the situation of having to deal with four separate project teams
from Big Oil, each of which was demanding that their specific needs be met. The
construction of the topsides for Milton exemplifies some of the challenges that appeared.
The fabrication of the topsides and deck structure for Milton (the major structural
element that supports and incorporates the production facilities) had been awarded to a
South East Asian fabrication yard. However, the performance of the Asian yard did not
meet expectations, and it was felt that their low bid price (while attractive enough to win
them the contract) contributed to their lack of flexibility and capability. The fabrication
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yard was not able to respond to the requirements for the reduced schedule and in an effort
to accelerate execution by 3 months the fabrication was shifted to a European yard
towards the middle of Year 3.
Unfortunately the European fabrication yard also struggled to deliver the topsides to
schedule. Indeed, the aimed for 3 months acceleration, and more, was lost as the
contractor ran into unexpected design and fabrication challenges creating cost overruns
and delays. The European yard was in fact a subsidiary of one of the contractors selected
for the program contracts and as the full complexity of the Milton design became
apparent they used variation orders extensively. In addition the Swingline project was
also being fabricated by the same contractor and the two Big Oil projects were competing
with each other for a limited pool of resources. The topsides experience was not unique
however, a second contractor on the Milton project also experienced difficulties in
meeting their obligations.
The structure for Milton was being fabricated in two sections, with the second section
being constructed in the United States. This contract had also been awarded as part of the
program strategy. This major element of the project also suffered from significant cost
overruns. The contract had been awarded to a firm whose contract bid price was "very
attractive" from Big Oils perspective. However, problems occurred because, as was
stated during an interview with one of the Big Oil senior managers "they told us that they
had the labor to do the job, but they didn't". In the end Big Oil had to step in and
effectively take over the detail responsibility for managing the job. By the completion of
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that phase of the project, fabrication of the second section had consumed double the man
hours planned!
Towards the end of summer of Year 4 the topsides left Europe for the United States. This
was several months later than planned and the journey now had to take place during the
hurricane season in the Gulf of Mexico; an extremely risky time to attempt such a transit.
Fortunately the project was lucky and the topsides arrived without further problems. The
mating of the two sections suffered some additional delays and it was not until the third
quarter of Year 5 that the offshore installation of Milton finally commenced. In the
opening months of Year 6 Milton delivered first oil and the project was completed.
5.2 Milton and the Program: What went wrong
The Milton facility, from an engineering standpoint, is a tremendous achievement. It
features several technical firsts and, for its type, is one of the largest facilities in the
world. However, schedule delays, changed contractors and a number of revisions to the
design, resulted in significant escalation to the cost of Milton. In the end the project was
delivered 5 months late and nearly 50% over budget. The problems that Milton
experienced were created by the confluence of a number of factors.
Inadequate front end loading.
It is well understood that projects suffer when inadequate front end loading (preliminary
design and analysis to understand the project) is carried out. The study of mega-projects
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cited in chapter two highlighted a lack of front end loading (FEL) as a contributing factor
in the performance of the "dog" projects (Merrow 2003). The Big Oil program projects
suffered from a lack of FEL. In order to secure the resources they needed the company
rushed ahead with a contract strategy based on extremely sparse information. After the
contracts were in place, and once adequate work had been done, it was discovered that
each field was really quite different and required unique solutions. The "design one, build
four" paradigm was wholly inappropriate. Unfortunately by the time this was realized it
was too late. The projects had commenced, contracts were in place, and the only
available option was to accept the cost and delays associated with changes.
Accelerated schedule.
The mega-project study also notes the deleterious impact of accelerated schedules on
large complex projects. The study states that:
"time pressure discourages full and effective team development while ironically making
it more important. This leads us to the clear conclusion that the proximate cause of
failure in mega-field development is schedule pressure. ,26
"With a single exception, the successful projects were not schedule-driven. This meant
the projects'schedules were derivative of the data needed to proceed rather than driven
by arbitrary (from the project's viewpoint) end dates. ,27
26 Merrow E., 2003, pp 92.
27 Ibid, pp 92.
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The Big Oil projects experienced a great deal of schedule pressure. Accelerating the
schedule played a role in curtailing the FEL and then collapsing the planned sequenced
development schedule to a parallel one. This meant that any opportunity for creating a
learning curve amongst the firms and their respective employees was lost. Everyone was
learning at the same time with no opportunity to deliver improvement to the next project-
in-line. The schedule pressure also damaged the relationships between the firms and
made the process of developing truly integrated project teams that much harder.
Contract strategy changes.
The shift from a sequenced program approach to a parallel individual project approach
dramatically changed the dynamics of the projects. Each project General Manager had
incentives to deliver his or her project on schedule and budget. This inevitably led to each
project pushing their claims of "priority needs" onto the contractors. The contractors,
under pressure to perform to an accelerated schedule, and with an increased work load
due to design changes and more parallel activities, struggled to cope. The result was
delays, variation orders and cost escalation.
Organizational design.
The shift in contract strategy, and the accelerated schedule alone would have taxed the
relationship between Big Oil and their contractors. This strain was compounded by the
introduction of design changes as the real nature of the fields revealed themselves. Over
and above that was the fact that Big Oil had not adequately developed an organization to
deal with the four parallel projects. Under the original program approach organizational
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capability had been established. With the shift in contracting approach this capability was
no longer deemed necessary and the capability was removed. The contractors were left
without a mechanism to adjudicate between competing interests, all of whom were Big
Oil representatives. It followed that someone (or some team) was always going to face a
disappointing outcome from interaction with the contractor. This was a further blow to
the contractor relationships and consequently the project suffered.
However, over and above these challenges, one theme emerged from the case study that
determined the success or failure of projects: relationships. This theme can best be
summed up by a statement from one of the senior project managers from Swingline:
"building success means making your contractors succeed"
The relationships between Big Oil and its contractors determine the project outcomes.
The issues raised above help shape the strength and effectiveness of that relationship.
Dealing with schedule pressure, or accommodating changes, effectively requires strong
relationships. The problems experienced on Milton with the fabrication yard contractors
may well have been avoidable had a strong relationship existed between the firms. As a
senior manager from Milton said:
"You can't write in everything (into the contract)....you need to build a partnership...
.... because it counts when you have problems"
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Exploring the reasons for failure or success of major projects requires an understanding
of how relationships shape the execution of those projects. Chapter six, in proposing a
system dynamics model of this environment, begins that exploration.
59
6.0 Project Model
The case study illustrates the importance of relationships between project sponsors and
contractors in delivering major project successfully. Virtually all major product systems
are developed through extended networks of organizations. The causal loops presented in
Chapter four identified one mechanism, variation orders, that exist between firms and
identified potential impacts derived from their use. The next step was to build a formal
model of these project relationships. System dynamics was used to build a project model
and was created using VensimTM software.
6.1 Model Structure
A key structure in most project models is the rework cycle, which is illustrated in Figure
12 below.28 This structure was first developed by Pugh-Roberts Associates (Sterman
2000) in relation to the Ingalls Shipyard claim and, as described in chapter three, it has
subsequently been revised and refined through many different applications (Abdell-
Hamid 1991, Repenning 2001, Ford and Sterman 1998, 2002).
28 Lyneis J.M., Cooper K.G., Els S.A., 2001, pp 245.
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Figure 14. The Rework Cycle Structure
The essential feature of the rework cycle is that the project begins with a stock of work,
or tasks, to do: Work To Be Done. Work is then carried out at a rate determined by the
number of people on the project and the productivity of those people. The quality of the
Work Being Done then determines whether the work is Work Really Done or
Undiscovered Rework. The stock of Undiscovered Rework is reduced over time as the
rework is discovered at the Rework Discovery rate at which point it moves into the stock
of Known Rework - essentially the tasks or work that need to be redone to match the
required quality. These tasks then move back into the stock of Work To Be Done.
The rework cycle constructed for this thesis is somewhat different from the version
illustrated above.
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Defects
In the thesis model the rework cycle is somewhat simplified by removing the stock of
Unknown Rework. This removes a delay in processing and executing the rework tasks,
making the project model more efficient (thus making the model conservative in its
behavior) while maintaining the essential feature of distinguishing between work to do,
work completed correctly and rework. The thesis model adds the variation order cycle to
capture this feature of interest. Tasks with defects move either to the stock of Task
Rework or Variation Orders Submitted. Variation orders are then approved as rework
tasks and move to the stock of Task Rework. A certain percentage of these Variation
Orders Approved as Rework Tasks also generate new tasks which enter the stock of
Project Tasks to Do at the rate of V. 0 New Task Generation Rate.
The variation order cycle captures the process whereby a certain percentage of tasks that
are identified as rework will generate variation orders. As discussed in chapter four, no
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contract can completely specify the tasks to be performed. As a result some rework tasks
can be subject to claims (variation orders for more money and time associated with a task
that now appears more complex than originally thought, for example) by the contractor.
In addition some of these variation orders generate new tasks that had not previously
been within the contractor's scope.
A further important feature of the thesis model is the linking of integration time to the
New Work Defects Fraction. In previous models, defect or error rates are typically
determined by variables such as staff morale, fatigue, experience and schedule pressure.
The concept is that unmotivated, tired, inexperienced or harried staff makes mistakes in
executing the tasks leading to defects. These phenomena are well understood and
represented in numerous project models. The thesis model however captures the idea that
a critical determinant of project success for complex systems is communication. When
teams in a complex project do not invest in integration activities (meetings, design
reviews, timely transfer of design specifications etc) elements of the project design
diverge and errors are introduced. Thus the New Work Defects Fraction is a function of
the Fraction Time on Integration.
The variation order cycle also impacts the relationship between project sponsor and
contractor and the financial performance of the project (as discussed in chapter four). The
model therefore also measures the financial performance of the contractor and this
performance determines in part the Percent of Rework Tasks submitted as Variation
Orders by Contractor, Desired Full Time Staff and the Initial Full Time Staff Completing
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the key structural elements of the model is the Relationship Index. This composite
variable captures the strength of the working relationship between the sponsor and
contractor and is a function of the Sustained Schedule Pressure, the Actual Staff to
Planned Staff Ratio and the Actual VO to Expected VO Ratio. The Relationship Index
variable then determines in part the Fraction Time on Integration and Percent ofRework
Tasks submitted as Variation Orders by Contractor. These relationships model the
reinforcing loop "Variation Order - Communication Loop" presented in chapter four.
In addition to the core structural elements outlined above, a number of other important
structures exist. The model includes structures for the hiring of staff and the build-up of
schedule pressure. A full model description, including formulations and model views is
available in Appendix A.
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6.2 Model Assumptions
The assumptions underlying the model structure are presented below:
Integration activities limit defects.
Defects or errors within the development of complex projects occur primarily as a result
of designs having conflicting details, rather than as a result of calculation error. Engineers
on the design teams of a project need to be informed of the way other elements of the
design impact their work, and need to inform other design teams of their requirements
and constraints. When teams fail to communicate, errors, design clashes and divergent
designs emerge. This assumption underlies the linking of integration time and error rates
in the model.
Management monitors the project schedule.
Contractor and sponsor management manages the project according to the schedule (in
the model this is an initial condition of 100 weeks). The contractor will hire/allocate staff
onto the project in response to schedule pressure. However, financial considerations also
determine the contractor's response to schedule pressure. A contractor feeling financial
pressure will not be as willing to shift staff onto the project or hire externally. Schedule
pressure also impacts the amount of time staff will invest in integration activities. It is
assumed that when staff feel under pressure to produce work they will cut back on the
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time they spend attending meetings and design reviews (integration activities) in a bid to
work on "productive tasks".
Variation orders come first.
The contractors will devote time and resources to variation orders ahead of other project
tasks. Variation orders represent an opportunity to generate additional income for the
contractor, over and above the agreed contract. It follows that resources will be devoted
to these activities as a priority.
Approval of variation orders takes time.
While generating variation orders are a priority for the contractors, the sponsor does not
approve them instantaneously. Variation orders require time to be generated, documented
and processed. The contents of the variation order become the subject of meetings to
negotiate the cost, the extent of the change and to disseminate the changes to affected
parties, seeking their response. Each variation order is tracked, audited and deliberated
over by both the contractor and the project sponsor. This all takes time and during this
time resources are devoted to the process by both parties.
Expectations exist for number of variation orders, time on integration and defect rates.
The project model is initialized with a number of benchmarked parameters. These include
Ideal Fraction Time on Integration, Benchmarked Percentage of Rework Tasks that lead
to Variation Orders and Typical New Task Correct Fraction. These initial conditions
reflect the assumption that sponsors and contractors will enter a project with a track
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record of experience behind them. This experience leads them to have expectations of
what a project will require in terms of time devoted to integration, how many variation
orders they expect and what percentage of tasks will need to be reworked. These
expectations then form both a comparative statistic for the actual project and a baseline
from which the project deviates.
Working relationships determine time on integration and use of variation orders.
The strength of the relationship between the project sponsor and contractor determines, in
part, the time devoted to integration activities. When the relationship between project
teams deteriorates (whether in response to schedule pressure, or rising project costs
through variation orders) the individuals in those teams are less willing to spend time
with each other. Thus a poor relationship leads to decreasing time spent in integration
activities. In addition, a poor relationship generates willingness to use variation orders. If
the relationship has become adversarial between the sponsor and contractor then the
contractor will feel justified in trying to "squeeze" the sponsor for more money.
No resource constraints.
The contractor is able to source as many engineers as are required, or desired, to staff the
project. All engineers have the appropriate experience and skills needed to perform their
work. In reality, contractors and project sponsors alike struggle to find the suitable human
resources required. The appropriate skills are not readily available and all firms operate in
a constrained market place. The scarcity of resources, and competition for same, drives
sponsors to prematurely award contracts to ensure access needed skills and physical
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assets. Contractors are also at the mercy of this dynamic (even as they try to exploit it in
negotiations with sponsors) and will sometimes find themselves without the needed skills
to fulfill their contractual obligations. The industry will remain challenged by this
scenario for years to come.
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7.0 Analysis & Results
The results from the simulation of the project model are presented below. Section 7.1
examines the effect that the contract lump sum price has on the final cost borne by the
contract sponsor. A number of different simulations were carried out with each
simulation using the same underlying model and a range of pricing alternatives. The
model was adjusted between simulations to capture the impact of various assumptions
with respect to the contractor's behavior and thus project performance. For instance, the
first simulation analyzed below included a number of assumptions that limited the impact
of the agreed pricing on the contractor's hiring policies and use of variation orders.
Section 7.2 will discuss the simulations in greater depth and explore the mechanisms
driving the outcomes. Section 7.3 explores the sensitivity of these results to a number of
key variables.
7.1 Effect of Agreed Lump Sum Price on Cost to Project Sponsor
7.1.1 Initial Conditions: Sponsor's Paradise
Project sponsors will attempt to maximize the value derived from a project by
minimizing the lump sum cost of the contract agreed with the contractor. In the model the
lump sum cost is based upon the agreed contracted engineering rate ("Margin Accepted
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on Contract") and the "Estimated StaffRequired". The first simulation includes the
following assumptions:
- That the agreed price will not affect the contractor's use of variation orders.
- That the price agreed will not impact the initial staff numbers the contractor
assigns to the project.
- That the agreed price will not affect the desire/ability of the contractor to hire staff
as needed during the project.
These assumptions are consistent with the project sponsor believing that the contractor
will be required to execute the project under the contract terms (schedule and budget).
It should be noted that the "Project Sponsor Cost" indicated below does not include any
costs associated with lost revenue from a delay in completing the project, for example
lost oil production. It is exclusively the cost of the contract agreed with the contractor.
This holds true for all the following analyses and any exceptions will be noted.
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Figure 17. Project Sponsor Cost - No Profit Effects
With the assumptions listed above included in the model, the cost to the project sponsor
is significantly reduced as a result of negotiating the cheaper engineering rate (total cost
of $21.1 million versus $25.33 million at the "preferred" rate of $100/eng*hr. A saving of
$4.23 million. Higher rates are shown for the purposes of comparison). To incorporate
the assumptions in the model, the following changes were made:
- The variable "SW Switch for profit effect on VO Submitted" is set to 0.
- The variable "SW Price impact on Initial Staff' is set to 0.
- The variable "SW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring" is set to 0.
Setting the switches to 0 effectively makes the contractor immune to pricing pressure
with respect to initial staffing, hiring and the use of variation orders. It is not surprising
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therefore that under these assumptions a project sponsor is well served by driving the
project price down.
7.1.2 Variation Orders are a Reality
The next simulation relaxes the assumption that the agreed price does not impact the
contractors desire to use variation orders. Thus the variable "SW Switchfor Profit effect
on VO submitted" is set at 1. This leaves in place the following assumptions:
- That the price agreed will not impact the initial staff numbers the contractor
assigns to the project.
- That the agreed price will not affect the desire/ability of the contractor to hire staff
as needed during the project.
The relaxation of the variation order assumption is consistent with the views enunciated
by a number of project managers interviewed. It is a widely held belief that the
contracting community will use variation orders to secure revenue. It therefore makes
sense to assume that the agreed price will affect the contractor's willingness to use
available contract mechanisms to secure revenue. The results of the simulation are shown
below. Again, the "Project Sponsor Cost" does not include revenue foregone from project
delays.
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Figure 18. Project Sponsor Cost - Profit Effect on Variation Orders
As with the first simulation, the results above indicate that the project sponsor is best
served by negotiating the lowest contract price possible. The benefit is not as marked
($19.63 million at $60/eng*hr versus $20.79 million at $100/eng*hr) with a "saving" of
$1.16 million. The slope of the graph has been reduced. This is due to the increase in the
costs associated with variation orders. As can be seen in Figure 19 the lower agreed price
resulted in significantly more revenue being generated from variation orders than the
contract executed at a higher agreed price. The difference of $3.15 million in variation
order revenue (between a project using an agreed $60/eng*hr and one with an agreed rate
of $1 00/eng*hr) is significant, but not enough to offset the savings created by selecting
the cheaper option.
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Figure 19. Pricing Effect on Variation Orders
7.1.3 A Smaller Team will get it Done.
The next simulation includes the effect of pricing on variation orders discussed above and
also relaxes the assumption that the price will not impact the initial staffing level selected
by the contractor. This is achieved by setting the variable "SW Price impact on Initial
Staff' to 1. In effect this acknowledges that a contractor facing reduced margins on a
project will attempt to complete the work with a smaller team. Project sponsors may well
be aware of this. The final assumption is held in place:
N That the agreed price will not affect the desire/ability of the contractor to hire staff
as needed during the project.
- - - - - - --.- - - - - - - --..-.- -.- - - --.- -.- -...- -.--.- -.- - - ---....
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This combination of assumptions captures an environment in which the sponsor believes
that the contractor is bound to execute the project and will still have to hire accordingly
as the project progresses even if the initial team is a smaller "tiger team". The results of
the simulation are shown below. Again, the "Project Sponsor Cost" does not include
revenue foregone from project delays.
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Figure 20. Project Sponsor Cost - Pricing Effect on Initial Staff
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Figure 21. Variation Order Revenue with Pricing effect on Initial Staff
A number of interesting results appear from this simulation. First, the cheapest contract
price no longer results in the lowest cost to the project sponsor. Negotiating for an
engineering rate of $60/eng*hr results in a total payment to the contractor over the project
of $21.57million. Accepting $1 00/eng*hr results in a total payment of $20.79 million.
Thus the "cheaper" contract ends up costing $780,000 more. Second, the delays to the
project are becoming significant. The project finishes in week 161 (61 weeks beyond the
planned completion date of 100 weeks 29 - the point at which the plot becomes a flat line
indicates project completion) for the agreed price of $1 00/eng*hr. For the cheaper
29 As discussed in Section 6 the model is initialized with a target completion date of 100 weeks. This is
used to calculate the initial staff required by the contractor to execute the project. As in reality, this
calculation does not accurately predict the amount of re-work required during project, nor the full extent of
variation orders submitted. As a result the project schedule slips relative to the predicted completion date
even for "ideal" contract rates. This is acceptable in a simplified model such as the one developed for this
thesis as it is more important to see the relative performance of the project under different assumptions than
the absolute numbers. Of course, it also reflects the reality of most projects quite nicely as well!
. ...... .... ......... . ........
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contract the project is completed in 232 weeks. This brings with it substantial costs to the
project sponsor above those of the payments to the contractor.
7.1.4 People Cost Money
The final simulation relaxes the last assumption; namely that the price agreed for the
contract does not affect the contractor's ability or desire to staff the project. This is
achieved by setting the variable "SW Switchfor Profit Multiplier on Hiring" is set to 1.
The effect of this is to enable the contractors to consider the profitability of the project in
making hiring decisions. Lower profitability translates into the contractor being reluctant
to hire engineers for the project.
With this last assumption lifted the contractor now considers project profit in decisions
related to the use of variation orders, the initial staffing of the project and the on-going
hiring of staff for that project. The results of the model simulations are shown below.
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Figure 22. Project Sponsor Cost - Pricing Effect on On-going Hiring
It can be seen that under these conditions, the lowest priced contract results in project
costs significantly higher than those accrued at the preferred higher contract price. The
project ends up costing $22.09 million at $60/eng*hr, some $1.21 million more than the
$20.88 million price tag at $100/eng*hr. The impact of the revised model is also evident
in the variation order revenues (see below), with $15.62 million in expected variation
order revenues for the cheaper contract as compared with $10.09 million at $100/eng*hr
and $8.25 million at $130/eng*hr.
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Figure 23. Variation Order Revenue - Pricing Effect on On-going Hiring
The project also suffers from substantial delay. The cheaper contract is now competed in
week 243. If we include the sponsor's financial penalty associated with the delay (lost oil
production for example), then the project sponsor cost results appear even worse. Figure
24 includes the impact of the project delay in the cost calculations.3 0 It can be seen that
when calculations include the costs of the project delay that these quickly dwarf the
"savings" to be made from selecting the cheapest contract price.
30 The delay cost is based on the project delivering revenue to payoff development cost in approximately 70
weeks. i.e the expected revenue stream from the project is $200,000 a week. Each weeks delay on project
delivery "costs" the project sponsor $200,000 in foregone revenue.
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Figure 24. Cost of Project: Lump Sum, Total Cost and Lost Earnings Included
7.2 Analysis of Results
It is important to understand the factors that lead to the results described above. The first
substantive change in the results (i.e reversing the slope of the plot of costs as a function
of price) occurred when the initial staff calculations included a pricing effect. The
analysis will begin with this before considering the case of no restrictions.
7.2.1 A Smaller Team Costs More
With the pricing impact on initial staff constraint removed, a lower agreed price provides
an incentive for the contractors to reduce the staff they allocate to the project. Under the
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restrictive assumption (section 7.1.2) 27 engineers were initially allocated to the project.
With freedom to set the initial staff numbers the project staff drops to 16 at $60/eng*hr.
As the project progresses the smaller staff does not deliver the progress anticipated by the
project schedule. The result is increased schedule pressure (see below). The plots are of
two projects, both at $60/eng*hr, but with one the "unaffected" version having no impact
on initial staff numbers from the reduced project price.
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Figure 25. Sustained Schedule Pressure - Reduced Initial Staff
This schedule pressure translates into a reduction in the amount of time invested in
integration activities (see Figure 26). This leads to an increased defect rate as less
communication results in suboptimal design.
31 As schedule pressure mounts the engineers focus on the "task at hand". Attending integration meetings
etc receives less attention as the need to get the drawings "out the door" dominates. Under these conditions
it is inevitable that effort is directed away from integration activities and towards completing detail design
work.
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Figure 26. Fraction Time on Integration - Reduced Initial Staff
In addition the schedule pressure increase stimulates hiring of staff by the contractor to
meet the project demands. Schedule pressure and increased staff numbers combine
together producing an adverse effect on the relationship between the sponsor and
contractor. This also limits the investment the firms make in integration activities. The
result of higher defect rates, and a weakened working relationship is more rework and
more variation orders (see Figure 27 and Figure 28).
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Figure 27. Task Rework - Reduced Initial Staff
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Thus the relaxation of the assumption that a lower priced project will not impact the
initial staff numbers leads to quite significant project cost increases for the "cheaper"
contracts. The dynamics explored above also account for the cost difference between the
project priced at $60/eng*hr and one at $100/eng*hr. This is because the more expensive
project uses an initial staff of 27 engineers and thus begins with the same staff numbers
(27 engineers) as the scenario where the price impact on initial staff is restricted.
7.2.2 People Cost Money, but not as much as Not Having Them
The final set of simulations presented in section 7.1.4 removed all the restrictions related
to the effects of project profit on contractor behavior. The contractor therefore considered
the project's profitability when making decisions regarding hiring in addition to variation
orders and establishing the initial staff size. The decision process is captured in the model
by the "Total Staff Multiplier " variable. This variable is multiplied by the "Initial Full
Time Staff" variable to calculate the "Indicated Desired Full Time Staff". The impact of
profit (or lack thereof) can be seen below in the plot of "Total Staff Multiplier ". To
demonstrate the impact of the profit assumption two simulations were run: "Affected"
and "Unaffected". The "Affected" included profit margin affects on staff hiring, the
"Unaffected" run did not. Both were run at the agreed contract rate of $60/eng*hr. As can
be seen below the "Total Staff Multiplier" for the "Affected" simulation lags the
"Unaffected" simulation.
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Figure 29. Total Staff Multiplier - Hiring Affected
What element of a real contractor's behavior does this plot describe? Simply that the
contractor, experiencing disappointing financial returns for the project, does not want to
carry the costs of higher staff numbers. Consequently the contractor does not man up as
rapidly in response to the schedule pressure, leading to lower work rates and even higher
schedule pressure (see Figure 31).
Full Time Staff
40
30
20
10
0
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
Time (Week)
Full Time Staff: Margin 60 - Hiring Aflected engineer
Full Tim Staff: Margin 60 - Hiring Unaffected - -- -------- -------------- ----- - - engineer
Figure 30. Full Time Staff - Hiring Affected
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Figure 31. Sustained Schedule Pressure - Hiring Affected
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The excess schedule pressure resulting from the revised hiring practice worsens the
relationship between contractor and sponsor. As seen previously, schedule pressure and a
poor relationship both negatively impact the time contractors devote to integration
activities. The result of curtailed integration time is of course more defects and thus more
variation orders (particularly if the relationship is under heightened strain). This is
evidenced in the plot of "Variation Orders Submitted" shown below.
Variation Orders Submitted
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Figure 32. Variation Orders Submitted - Hiring Affected
The upshot of profit pressure on hiring are the results presented in section 7.1.4: the cost
of the project creeps up further and the schedule delay continues to extend.
The above analysis discussed the effect of contractor's profit on hiring by comparing two
simulations: one which included the effect and one which did not. We now need to
explore how different project pricing levels, when combined with the profit effect on
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hiring, shape the outcome of the project. To keep the plots simple two simulations will be
compared; one at $60/eng*hr and one at $1 00/eng*hr.
As discussed previously, the cheaper contract commences with fewer staff than the more
expensive contract (16 rather than 27). The smaller project team does not deliver the
work completion rate anticipated by the schedule and the result is increased schedule
pressure. This creates a need for additional staff which the price restricted contract is
unable to respond to as effectively as the more expensive contract. As can be seen in the
plot shown below the expensive contract begins with more staff and responds to schedule
pressure by hiring as required. The cheaper contract has a damped response, however the
sustained schedule pressure (shown in Figure 34), has the ultimate effect of forcing the
cheaper contract to more than double it's initial staff to 33 full time staff.
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Schedule pressure remains more acute for longer at $60/eng*hr than $1 00/eng*hr.
Sustained Schedule Pressure
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Figure 34. Sustained Schedule Pressure - Profit Margin Effect Included
Schedule pressure adversely affects the amount of time devoted to integration activities
and as a result defect rates increase and rework is generated. It is therefore not surprising
that the $60/eng*hr contract project experiences more rework than the $1 00/eng*hr
project.
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Figure 35. Task Rework - Profit Margin Effect Included
Rework represents additional tasks over and above the original schedule adding to the
schedule pressure and requiring additional resources. As we have seen before schedule
pressure damages the relationship between the project sponsor and the contractor as does
an increase in initial staff numbers. Deteriorating relationships, combined with financial
pressure leads to increased use of variation orders (and given that variation orders are
generated from rework task it also holds that increased rework, ceteris paribus, would
result in increased variation orders). We therefore expect that the cheaper contract
generates more variation orders than the more expensive contract. And so it proves to be
(see below).
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Figure 36. Variation Orders Submitted - Profit margin Effect Included
The end result is that the "cheaper" contract ends up being the more expensive one.
7.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented above strongly suggest that cheaper contracts can result in more
expensive projects once the full implications of resourcing restrictions and revenue
seeking incentives are included. However, it is important to understand how sensitive the
model is to changes in key parameters. Could small changes in an assumed variable value
significantly alter the results presented?
VensimTM provides a number of tools to help answer that question. A first step is to
utilize the optimization feature. This allows for the effect of varying the predefined
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constants to be evaluated with respect to a payoff function (a single variable that captures
the important features of the model in a single number - "Project Sponsor Cost" in this
case). A number of these optimizations were conducted with the model constants being
varied by +/- 50%. A range of payoff functions were used, including "Project Sponsor
Cost", "Expected Variation Order Revenue" and "Variation Orders Submitted". The
output of these optimization runs (See Appendix C) lists the constants, in descending
order, of most impact on the payoff function.
The output revealed a number of influential parameters. Of interest were those that made
a difference when the issue of contract price was considered. Putting it another way,
constants such as the "Initial Project Tasks ", while revealed as important, are important
notwithstanding the contract price. By controlling for the constants that most impact
variation orders the following three variables were found to be of particular interest:
"Variation Order Mark Up ", "Time for Sponsor to Approve VO" and "Ideal Fraction
Time on Integration".
7.3.1 Sensitivity to Variation Order Mark Up
The rate at which a contractor charges for variation orders does not have to be the same
as the rate accepted for the general contract. The "Variation Order Mark Up " variable
accounts for this. A number of simulations were run with different contract prices and
different mark up multipliers. The results can be seen in Figure 37 below. As expected a
higher mark up percentage increases the costs for the project sponsor. However, it is
interesting to note that the variance of costs associated with the initially cheaper contract
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is higher. The $60/eng*hr contract has an average cost of $20 million with a variance of
$1.2 million, compared with an average price of $19.6 million and a variance of $0.44
million for a contract at $1 00/eng*hr.
Effect of VO Mark Up on Sponsor Cost
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Figure 37. Project Sponsor Cost - Effect of VO Markup
Mark Up % Mark Up % Mark Up %
Agreed Contract
Rate ($/eng*hr) 110 125 140 Average Variance
60 18.63 20.05 21.31 20 1.20
100 18.76 19.59 20.38 19.58 0.43
130 21.38 21.38 21.83 21.53 0.045
Table 2. Project Sponsor Cost ($M) - VO Markup Varied
From a sponsors point of view this suggests two things. First, that to control for the
variance of outcomes a higher initial project price may be warranted. Secondly, that it is
important to be aware of the contractors anticipated mark up for variation orders. Of
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course, the lower mark up percentage also delivered additional project delays as shown in
the figure below. The cost of any delay may offset the advantage to be gained by pushing
for lower mark up rates.
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Figure 38. Effect of VO Markup - Contract Margin Varied
7.3.2 Sensitivity to Variation Order Approval Time
Once variation orders are generated considerable work ensues with respect to negotiating
the variation and approving the changes (and particularly the cost of those changes). This
approval process can take considerable time, and to a large extent is controlled by the
project sponsor. Thus it was important to consider the sensitivity of the overall project
cost to variations in the approval time, not only from the perspective of cost outcomes,
but also as this may offer the sponsors an opportunity to influence project outcomes. The
results are particularly interesting (see Figure 39 below).
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Figure 39. Project Sponsor Cost - VO Approval Time Varied
It can be seen that the variation order approval time has significant influence on the
overall project cost. Changing the approval time from 16 weeks to 4 weeks results in
savings of nearly $14 million at a contract rate of $60/eng*hr! (See Table 3 below). Why
does this occur?
Approval Approval Approval Approval
Time Time Time Time
Agreed Contract
Rate ($Ieng*hr) 4wks 8wks 12wks 16wks Average Variance
60 12.79 17.53 22.09 26.77 19.8 27.03
100 14.29 17.59 20.88 24.19 19.24 13.60
130 16.85 19.58 22.27 25 20.93 9.20
Table 3. Project Sponsor Cost ($M) - VO Approval Time Varied
Effect of VO Approval Time on Sponsor
Cost
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Once a variation order is approved it becomes either a rework task, or a new task (if
inadvertently left out of the initial contract). Approval lets the work move forward.
Delaying the approval delays completion of the work, and diverts the contractors
resources towards the inevitable meetings associated with obtaining approval. In addition,
delayed approval is likely to have adverse effects on the relationship between the
contractor and sponsor (as the contractor becomes frustrated that no agreement on the
changes are reached, and the sponsor becomes irritated at the contractor raising the issue
at each meeting - even those meetings not directly related to the changes) generating
more delays and variation orders.
Again it is interesting to note that while all agreed contract prices benefit from faster
variation approval, the cheaper contracts are affected more strongly. The variance of the
project cost at $60/eng*hr is $27 million compared with $13.6 million at $100/eng*hr.
Cheaper contracts again prove to be more volatile.
7.3.3 Sensitivity to Ideal Fraction Time on Integration
The final set of sensitivity analysis presented considers the effects of varying the assumed
ideal fraction of time devoted to integration activities. The variable "Ideal Fraction Time
on Integration " is set to 0.4 in the model. This suggests that under ideal conditions the
contractor would devote 40% of their time to engaging in the critical integration activities
required for executing complex projects. In some respects this could be considered a
proxy variable for the perceived complexity (or integrality) of the system. More complex
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systems will require devoting more time to integration tasks. A number of interesting
results become apparent when the "Ideal Fraction Time on Integration " is varied.
First, it is again clear that a cheaper contract price is accompanied by increased variance
of outcome, as a function of ideal integration time (see Figure 40 below). A contract
struck at $60/eng*hr has a variance of $0.59 million, compared with $0.043 million for a
contract set at $100/eng*hr. This follows the pattern seen in each of the above sensitivity
analysis. Cheaper contracts appear more volatile with respect to a number of parameters.
Effect of Ideal Fraction Integration Time on
Sponsor Cost
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Figure 40. Effect of Varying the Ideal Fraction Integration Time
A second interesting result emerges from this sensitivity analysis. If we calculate the
variance of the project cost as a function of the ideal time devoted to integration
activities, we see that the "simpler" projects (assuming ideal integration time to be a
.2=a
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98
proxy for project complexity) have lower cost variance. The variance of project cost
outcomes associated with an integration time fraction of 0.1 is $0.025 million. With an
ideal integration time fraction of 0.5 the variance is $0.463 million. Simpler projects
suffer less cost variance. Finally, it can be seen that the simpler projects actually meet the
sponsor's expectations of saving money by negotiating a cheaper price. At $60/eng*hr
the project cost is $21.04 million, while at $100/eng*hr the project cost is $21.29 million
(see Table 4 below).
Agreed Contract Integration Integration Integration Integration Integration
Rate ($/enp*hr) Fraction Time Fraction Time Fraction Time Fraction Time Fraction Time
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 Average Variance
60 21.04 21.27 21.61 22.9 22.76 21.92 0.591784
70 21.35 21.45 21.64 21.92 22.28 21.73 0.113896
80 21.41 21.4 21.41 21.5 21.85 21.51 0.029544
90 21.35 21.22 21.09 21.2 21.24 21.22 0.00692
100 21.29 21.05 20.91 20.88 20.66 20.96 0.043176
110 21.42 21.2 21.18 21.28 21.32 21.28 0.00752
120 21.58 21.4 21.48 21.74 22.05 21.65 0.05288
130 21.78 21.64 21.82 22.27 22.86 22.07 0.199104
Average 21.4 21.33 21.39 21.71 21.88
Variance 0.02482449 0.032477551 0.087812245 0.191097959 0.463726531 1
Table 4. Project Sponsor Cost ($M) - Varying Project Complexity (Ideal Fraction
Integration Time)
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8.0 Discussion
Assumptions
The results described above carry with them certain assumptions. It is useful to restate
these before considering more broadly the implications of the results. First, that oil and
gas development projects feature complex product systems that are highly integral in
nature. Second, the development of these product systems requires significant investment
in integration activities by the firms engaged in their delivery. Third, that the motivation
for the investment in integration is developed through relationships based on trust and
mutual goals. Finally, that the firms engaged in a project organization, sponsor and
contractor, act to create value for their shareholders by taking what they perceive as the
appropriate actions. Linking these assumptions together generated the causal structures
described in chapter four. Modeling these relationships in a system dynamics model and
applying the motivation of financial self-interest to each of the firms engaged in the
project (sponsor and contractor) allowed a number of findings to become evident.
Findings
The key findings from the research were:
1. Projects developing complex integral product systems display price sensitive
"tipping-point" behavior.
1.1 Securing the most cost effective solution for a project may involve
carrying higher initial, lump-sum, costs.
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1.2 Projects with contractors operating close to the price sensitive region are
highly volatile.
2 Complex projects (those requiring significant integration efforts) are more
sensitive to price driven behaviors than simpler architectures.
This second point, and the price sensitive tipping point, can be seen clearly in the
following figure. The plot shows a three dimensional map of the project space with
project costs on the vertical axis. This cost is a function of both the agreed contract rate
and the project complexity.
Project Sponsor Cost: A function of Complexity and Price
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Figure 41. The Price Sensitive Tipping Point
It is instructive to examine these findings in relation to the case study presented in
chapter five. The outcomes experienced on the Milton project appear to provide some
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evidence for the notion of a price sensitive tipping point. A number of the contractors
selected that had problems in executing their contracts were also noted as being
remarkable cheap in relation to their competitors. We are unable to determine whether
these firms would still have had problems had their prices been higher, or to what extent
the bid prices reflected a lack of understanding of the cost of the job rather than an
attempt to "buy" the work by driving down costs. However, it still remains the case that
these contractors were described by Big Oil management as being revenue/resource
constrained in their ability to deliver on their promises.
The results from the sensitivity analysis showed that, for a number of variables tested,
projects operating below the contractors "preferred" returns demonstrate more variance
of outcomes. This volatility suggests that projects operating thusly are more likely to
generate undesirable behavior in the face of perturbations such as late changes and the
like. In addition, and quite intriguingly, the results indicated that projects which are
developing highly integral product architectures are more susceptible to the dynamics
investigated than simpler systems. This finding has a number of implications for the
design of projects organizations. The establishment of the project organization is
frequently carried out without detailed reference to the complexity of the underlying
product systems (in at least that while the contracts are written to ensure that the project
teams are established with the technical requirements considered, the financial aspects of
the complexity are treated separately). Deeper understanding of the results, and the
findings derived from them, can be gained through approaching them with a number of
different frameworks.
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Relational and Formal Contracts
The enterprise established to execute major oil and gas projects is assembled through a
mix of formal and relational contracts. Formal contracts are those that can be enforced by
a third party, for example the courts, and are specified ex ante in terms that can be
verified ex post (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2002). For oil and gas development
projects these are the formal mechanisms that define the project scope, its costs and the
scope change mechanisms such as variation orders. Relational contracts are "informal
agreements sustained by the value of future relationships"3 2 . As presented by Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy (2002) relational contracts are an essential (some would argue the
essential) mechanism for circumventing difficulties in formal contracts. They are
sustained by the promise or expectation of future working relationships between agents,
and the value derived from these relationships. Relational contracts are therefore a very
important mechanism between the project sponsor and the contractor(s). Sharing of
knowledge and requirements, attendance of meetings and efficacious delivery of
information are all attributes of the relational contracts that exist between firms engaged
in the delivery of a project. In the model presented in this thesis the relational contract
was represented by the Relationship Index that informed the amount of time devoted to
integration activities. The formal contract was represented by the cost and pricing
mechanisms of the lump sum price and variation order revenue. It could be argued that
the use of variation orders, which occurred as a result of a deteriorating relationship,
reflect the trade-off being made between the value of one contract form and another.
Reneging on the relational contract invoked the use of the formal mechanisms. The
32 Baker G., Gibbons R., Murphy K, J., 2002, pg 39.
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"tipping point" therefore also reflects a shift away from informal mechanisms towards
more formal ones.
In a project enterprise a network of formal and relational contracts exists. The project
sponsor formally contracts with various contractors to deliver portions of the project such
as the fabrication of the hull, design of the topsides, fabrication of the topsides, design of
the subsea system, installation of the facility offshore etc. Both formal and relational
contracts exist between the sponsor and each of the contractors. However, in most project
teams only relational contracts exist between the contractors. The diagram below
indicates this structure. Formal (F) contracts exist between the sponsor (SP) and each of
the contractors (C1, C2, C3). Relational contracts (R) also exist between the sponsor and
each of the contractors. The three contractors are linked only through the formal contracts
to the sponsor and through relational contracts to each other. In reality the project could
involve a dozen or so contractors with some being "second tier" suppliers to the primary
contractors and thus sharing formal contracts as well. The diagram shows a very
simplified representation of the network.
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Formal and Relational Contract Networks
0SP
SF F
/ ~ Ri F
R R
C1 C2 C3
R
SP =Project Sponsor
C1,2,3 = Contractor 1 etc
F = Formal Contract
R = Relational Contract
Figure 42. Contract Networks
In the oil and gas industry there are only a handful of firms that have the required skills
and assets to execute the projects. As a result the firms tend to work together on different
projects repeatedly. This helps establish the relational contracts. However, the cost of
reneging on these relational contracts is highly variable. Where these firms are not in
competition the cost of reneging may be sufficiently high to encourage cooperation
between them. In many cases though the firms, while working together on the current
project, may be in direct competition for the next development. In these cases the cost of
reneging on the relational contract that exists between the contractors may be very low
(indeed there may even be incentives to do so, i.e. by withholding information the firm
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may be able to advantage itself relative to its competitors). Only the formal and relational
contracts to the project sponsor provide the cohesive mechanisms.
The research findings suggest that beyond a price sensitive tipping point project
execution becomes increasingly difficult. The consequences include a reduction in the
time a contractor will devote to integration activities. Consideration of this finding, in
conjunction with the environment of networked relational contracts, suggests the
possibility of the project experiencing "contractor contagion".
If one contractor reneges on the relational contract with the sponsor it follows that they
will also, or are likely to, renege on the relational contracts between the contractors. The
manifestation of this reneging, as represented in this model, is shifting resources away
from integration activities. This has consequences for other contractors working on
highly integral systems and invokes the "variation order - communication loop" shown in
chapter four. As integration meetings usually involve several of the firms engaged on the
contract, limiting effort in this area affects their work as well. Through this mechanism
we can see how the dynamics shown in chapter four could "spread" from contractor to
contractor once an initial disruption (the initial reneging) occurs. The idea of "contractor
contagion" is analogous to the "fire fighting" dynamic within the single firm, multi-
project environment (Repenning 2002), suggesting an opportunity for further research.
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Alignment
The findings of the research can be framed in terms of alignment between the
contractor's and project sponsor's incentives. Alignment of the incentives between firms
is achieved when the risks, costs and rewards of doing business are distributed fairly
across the network (Narayanan and Raman 2004). In the thesis model the alignment
between sponsor and contractor can be characterized as somewhat orthogonal. At first
approximation it can be seen that the firms behave as if the financial incentives are not
aligned. When project sponsors drive down the initial lump-sum cost of a project, this is
clearly at the expense of the contractor's financial position. When contractors invoke
variation orders to secure revenue, this is not in the financial interests of the sponsor. This
creates an adversarial relationship which is an essential element of the enterprise
architecture delivered by the contractual relationship. The misalignment between the
sponsor and contractor generates additional expense for the sponsor which can be viewed
as a transaction cost. 33
Putting to one side issues of risk, and alignment of risk (other than financial risk), the
contractor and sponsor are aligned in some respects. For example, from a relational
contract perspective, both firms want the project to succeed. The contractor wants to
improve their standing with the sponsor and win future work, as well as more generally
have the success of the project recognized and thus build a favorable reputation in the
market place. From the project sponsor's perspective, a successful project and
33 The contractor also faces transaction costs from delays and variation order generation. As the project
drags on, this limits the ability of the firm to bid on the next project and the opportunity cost of missing out
on additional work represents a transaction cost.
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relationship with the contractor lowers the transaction cost of future relationships. For
example, by lowering the information search cost when selecting contractors for future
developments. This explains the characterization of the alignment as somewhat
orthogonal. Perceptions of the financial alignment are at odds, while the incentives based
on relational contracts are reasonably aligned. It is important to note that the results
suggest that understanding the full implications of the price-sensitive tipping point would
allow for the misalignment of financial incentives to be recognized for what it is; an
artifact of the behavior of the system.
This suggests that alignment of incentives requires an alternative enterprise architecture.
The orthogonal architecture, characterized by an adversarial element, may be improved
by moving to a more fully aligned architecture. Recognizing that the misalignment exists
within a spectrum of possible solutions provides an opportunity to address it. Under the
structure modeled in the thesis a number of project pricing solutions deliver improved
project performance in comparison to the "zero-sum game" approach of minimizing up
front costs. However, it is not explicitly evident to the project sponsor and contractor that
alternatives exist. Different enterprise architectures, an alliance or joint venture structure
for example, may make the tradeoffs explicit and allow for the misalignment to be
minimized.
Implications for Practitioners
As discussed above, the findings carry the promise of significant benefits for project
managers and the firms engaged in large engineering projects. The existence of tipping
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point behavior related to pricing forces a shift away from the zero-sum game approach
alluded to above. The implications of this are profound. Pushing for the lowest price
carries significant risks, however the sponsors are wary of allowing the contractors to
capture an inappropriate share of the economic rent from a project. The optimal pricing
point for the project exists in a region near the contractors "preferred" pricing structure
(i.e the price at which they make their normal desired returns). Negotiating the fair, and
optimal price, for the contract requires understanding that all parties need to be
financially rewarded for their participation. This suggests a far more open relationship
than is currently the norm. Studies of successful inter-firm relationships, usually in a
supply chain context, indicate that when firms develop close and consistent relationships
they often involve an "open book" philosophy, and an expectation of secure long term
partnerships (Womack, Jones and Roos 1991).
If project sponsors still choose to push for the lowest possible up front prices, and
relationship durations only as long as the next competitive bid, then this decision should
be made taking into account the following:
1 Projects operating in the price sensitive region are essentially unstable in the face of
changes. Therefore, a great deal of effort must be put into front end loading (FEL) to
ensure that the number of project changes is kept to an absolute minimum.
2 The lowest cost solutions are robust only for simple projects that are not highly
integral. For some projects in which the scope is very clear, and unlikely to change,
and which represent "standard" applications of technology then a low cost solution
may be appropriate.
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3 Delaying approval of variation orders increases the delays, and problems, for a
project. Project managers, when faced with increasing numbers of variation orders,
should consider expediting approval to give the project a chance to move ahead. This
will aid in restoring the relationship between the contractor and sponsor in addition to
relieving the resource pressure that exists as both teams devote energy to the
management of the variation orders.
While the discussion above sets out some steps to deliver effective projects, the winning
approach is best summed up by a quote from a senior project manager given when
discussing how best to manage projects:
"projects that are approached as a win-win are very successful"
8.1 Future Research Directions
A number of issues were raised by the results that require further research. First, the
notion of "contractor contagion" requires further investigation. Virtually all projects of
any significance are executed by teams of contractors and it is worthwhile understanding
to what extent problems for one contractor transfer to other members of the project team,
and how that occurs. Second, alternative enterprise architectures and structures that
provide for improved alignment of incentives need research. It is proposed in the next
stage of this research endeavor that "alliance" project organizations will be investigated.
Third, the impact that integral product system architecture has on project performance
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and the relationship to appropriate contract structures warrants serious study. As
indicated in the results, the level of effort required for integration has significant
influence on the project outcome. Finally, misalignment between firm incentives as a
transaction cost and the implication this has on the question of integration of resources is
worthy of further consideration. For firms that are regularly delivering complex projects
as part of their business, it makes sense to consider the value implications for the
integration of the services they depend on.
III
9.0 Conclusions
Project based organizational structures are utilized in many industries, and on many
scales. This thesis has principally been interested in understanding how the contracting
relationship influences the performance of large engineering projects. A simple system
dynamics project model was developed with the addition of an explicit representation of
the relationship between the contractor and project sponsor, including the variation order
generation and revenue process. The model was informed by a case study of a series of
major projects carried out by an oil and gas major. The results of the research supported
the view that the contracting relationship, and in particular the initial negotiated price,
can have a profound effect on the project's performance. A number of interesting
findings emerged, not least of which being that the project model demonstrated a price
sensitive "tipping point" in its outcomes. The results also indicated that the relative
sensitivity of the project to the contracting relationship is in part dependent on the degree
of integration/complexity demonstrated by the underlying product system.
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Appendix A: Model Documentation
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Model Text File
SW Switch for RI effect on VO Submitted=
1
Dmnl
Switch to activate the effect of the relationship on VO submission
Multiplier for Percent of Rework Tasks Contractor submits for VO=
IF THEN ELSE(SW Switch for RI effect on VO Submitted=1, Table for RI
Impact on VO Submitted(Relationship Index), 1)
Dmnl
Multiplier that results as a function of the relationship between
contractor and project sponsor. It modifies the percentage of rework tasks
that the contractor submits VOs for.
Effect of VO Ratio on VO Pressure Table(
[(0,0)-
10,3)],(O,0),(1,1),(1.71254,1.49123),(2.47706,1.92982),(3.63914,2.32456),(5,2.5),(7.5,2.5
),(10,2.5))
Dmnl
This look-up function maps the effect of VO submission on the RI
VO Pressure=
Effect of VO Ratio on VO Pressure Table(Actual VO to Expected VO Ratio)
Dmnl
Multiplier for the effect of VO submitted - more VOs lead to higher
pressure and a worsening relationship
Indicated RI=
l/(VO Pressure*Sustained Schedule Pressure*Actual Staff to Planned Staff Ratio)
Dmnl
The indicated RI is generated from the Schedule Pressure (high pressure
leads to low RI), VO Pressure (high VO submission leads to low RI) and the
Staff Ratio (higher staff than expected leads to a reduced RI)
SW Price impact on Initial Staff=
Dmnl
Turns on the effect of the Margin Accepted in reducing the Initial Staff
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Initial Full Time Staff=
(MIN(Estimated Staff Required,Estimated Staff Required*IF THEN ELSE( SW
Price impact on Initial Staff= 1 , Margin Accepted on Contract, 1)))*SW Staff reduction
based on Scale and synergy expectations
~~ engineer
Initial full time staff is calculated from the estimated staff and then
modified with respect to the margin accepted on the contract. Lower margins
means reduced initial staff numbers.
"Optimization test - Revenue Gap "=
5.4e+006-Expected Variation Order Revenue
Variable for Optimization Tests
Price per Task=
Project Lump Sum Price/Initial Project Tasks
$/Tasks
Cost of each task, based on agreed Price and Initial task numbers
Percent Increase in Project Cost to Sponsor-
(Project Sponsor Cost/Project Lump Sum Price)* 100
Dmnl
The percent increase in project cost
VO Task revenue generation rate=
Variation order generation*Price per Task*Finish Switch
$/Week
~~ Rate at which the cost of VOs generated
VO task revenue= INTEG (VO Task revenue generation rate,0)
Revenue generated by the VO tasks accumulating
SW VO Ratio Impact on RI=
Dmnl
~~ Switch to activate the effect of VO submission on RI
Project Lump Sum Price=
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Contracted Hourly Engineering Rate*Current Work Week*Initial Completion
Date*Estimated Staff Required*Unit Lead Engineer
Lump Sum agreed to by the project sponsor. Calculated by the Contractor
based on initial staffing estimates, agreed rate and schedule.
Variation Order Invoices= INTEG (VO Invoice Generation,O)
Tasks
The total Number of Variation Orders generated over the project - a
cumulative total of Invoices
Actual VO to Expected VO Ratio=
IF THEN ELSE(SW VO Ratio Impact on RI=l,Max(l,zidz(Variation Order
Invoices,Expected Variation Orders)), 1)
Dmnl
~~ The ratio of actual VO generated on the project to the anticipated number
of VOs
VO Invoice Generation=
Variation order generation
Tasks/Week
Rate at which variation orders are generated
SW TCA Sched Press=
0
~ Dmnl
Switch to include Tasks Completed for Approval in calculating the
schedule pressure. "Progress" can be calculated based on either just the Tasks Completed,
or inclusive of those tasks that are awaiting approval.
Indicated Completion Rate=
(Tasks Completed+(SW TCA Sched Press*Tasks Completed for
Approval))/Completion Rate Evaluation Period
Tasks/Week
~~ Indicated rate at which the tasks are being completed based on elapsed
time
Delay Penalty=
(IF THEN ELSE( Finish Switch>0, (Delayed Start Count-Initial Completion
Date)*Delay Cost, 0 ))*SW Delay Penalty Switch
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This is the Opportunity Cost of Project Delay - i.e loss of Sponsor
Revenue from not having the plant producing goods.
SW Delay Penalty Switch=
0
~ Dmnl
Switch to turn on the Delay Penalty of opportunity cost for the Project \
Sponsor from the project being delayed.
New Work Defects Fraction=
(1-Tasks Designed Correctly Multiplier*Typical New Task Correct Fraction)*SW
Defect Switch
Defects/Tasks
Percent of new work tasks that are designed with defects
Percent of Rework tasks submitted as VO Orders by Contractor-
MIN(1,Multiplier for Percent of Rework Tasks Contractor submits for
VO*Benchmarked Percentage of Rework Tasks that lead to VO*SW Desire to generate
VO*Multiplier for Profit Margin on VO submitted)
Dmnl
Includes switch to turn VO generation desire on
Typical New Task Correct Fraction=
0.85
~ Defects/Tasks
Under "ideal" conditions (i.e 40% of time on integration) it is expected
that 85% of New Tasks are Correctly delivered first time
Tasks Designed Correctly Multiplier=
Table for Integration Multiplier on Defects(Fraction Time on Integration)
Dmnl
Multiplier that captures the effect of investing in integration activities
on defect rates.
Delayed Start Count=
(IF THEN ELSE(Finish Switch>0, Time*Finish Switch, 0))+(IF THEN
ELSE(Time<Initial Completion Date, Initial Completion Date-Time, 0))
Week
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This is a counter for the weeks that occur AFTER the initial completion
date. A counter of the Project Delay.
Indicated Desired Full Time Staff=
Max(Initial Full Time Staff,Total Staff Multiplier* Initial Full Time Staff)
engineer
~~ The Desired Full Time as modified by the schedule pressure (wanting to
hire) and the Profitability of project (resisting hire)
Total Staff Multiplier-
Desired Full Time Staff Multiplier*Multiplier for effect of Profit Ratio on Desired
Full Time Staff
Dmnl
Combined multiplier for effects of profit margins and schedule pressure
Expected Project Break Even=
"Expected (Acceptable) Project Cost over time, capped"
Project break even is the total cost of the project capped at the Lump Sum
cost
Multiplier for effect of Profit Ratio on Desired Full Time Staff=
IF THEN ELSE( SW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring = 1, Effect of Profit
Margin on Desired Staff Table (Ratio of Actual Project Margin to Desired Margin), 1)
Dmnl
Multiplier that results from the effect of the ratio of actual project
profit to desired profit.
Ratio of Actual Revenue to Project Break Even=
zidz(Actual Cumulative Project Revenue,Expected Project Break Even)*SW
Project Profit Switch
Dmnl
Ratio of the revenue from the project to the project break even. Gives a
measure of the performance of the project from the Contractors perspective
"Contractor Preferred (Typical) Profit Margin"=
Preferred Return Hourly rate/Break Even Hourly Rate
~~ Dmnl
The "normal" hourly rate divided by the break even hourly rate indicates
the typical or preferred profit margin for the Contractor
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Ratio of Actual Project Margin to Desired Margin=
zidz(Ratio of Actual Revenue to Project Break Even,"Contractor Preferred
(Typical) Profit Margin")
Dmnl
Measures the ratio of actual achieved margin to the desired margin. When
this ratio = 1 then we are achieving a margin that equates with the desired
$100/$70 return expected.
Multiplier for Profit Margin on VO submitted=
IF THEN ELSE(SW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted = 1,Table for
impact of Profit Margin on VO submitted (Ratio of Actual Project Margin to Desired
Margin), 1)
Dmnl
~~ Modifies the strength of the use of VOs as a percent of rework base on
profitability of the project
Delay Cost=
200000
S$/Week
The cost of the project being delayed. This can be thought of as lost
revenue, from lost sales of the product being developed, time cost of money, etc
Project Sponsor Cost=
Project Lump Sum Price+Expected Variation Order Revenue+Delay Penalty
Cost to the Project Sponsor is the Lump Sum Cost plus the Variation
Orders plus the Opportunity Cost for delay.
Variation Order Engineering Rate=
Max(Variation Order Mark Up*Preferred Return Hourly rate,Contracted Hourly
Engineering Rate)
$/(engineer*hour)
Variation Orders are charged at the Highest of the Preferred rate or the
Contracted Rate
Variation Order Revenue Generation Rate=
(VO Generation Effort Drain*Variation Order Engineering Rate/VO Task
Productivity)*Finish Switch
$/Week
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~~ Rate at which VO Tasks generate Revenue for the Contractor
Full Time Staff= INTEG (+Full Time Staff Hiring Rate,Initial Full Time Staff)
engineer
The total staff on the Project
Variation Order Mark Up=
1.5
~ Dmnl
Mark Up for Variation Orders over normal rate
Actual Project Profit=
Actual Cumulative Project Revenue-Actual Total Project Cost to Contractor
The actual contractors profit as generated by project revenues from VOs
and agreed rate and project costs.
SW Project Profit Switch=
1
Dmnl
Switch to turn on profit accounting ratio
Table for impact of Profit Margin on VO submitted(
[(0,0)-(3,3)],(0,3),(0.25,2),(0.5,1.5),(0.75,1.2),(1,1),(1.25,0.85),(1.5,0.75),(2.25\
,0.5),(3,0.5))
Dmnl
A table that modifies the eagerness to use VOs based on the profit of the
project. When the project has 0 profit or less (losing money) 3.0 times as
likely to use VOs. When we are double the expected profit - half as likely
Expected Project Profit=
Expected Cumulative Project Revenue-"Expected (Acceptable) Project Cost over
time, capped"
Expected Contractor's Profit to be generated over the project. Based on
initial staff assumptions and project durations.
"Expected (Acceptable) Project Cost over time, capped"=
MIN(Expected Cost Accumulated to Contractor,Project Lump Sum Cost)
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~~ The Expected Project cost to the Contractor expressed cumulatively over
the project duration, but capped at the Lump Sum Cost
SW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=
1
Dmnl
Switch to isolate effect of profit ratio on submission of VOs
Effect of Profit Margin on Desired Staff Table(
[(0,0)-
(2,1)],(0,0),(0.15,0.15),(0.25,0.25),(0.5,0.5),(0.74,0.755),(0.911315,0.91228 1\
),(1,0.960526),(1.1682,0.986842),(1.4,1),(2, 1))
Dmnl
Plots the desire to hire staff against profits. When the project is not
making any profit there is no desire to hire staff.
SW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=
Dmnl
Switch to turn on the effect of profit ratio on hiring
Actual Cumulative Project Revenue=
Expected Variation Order Revenue+Expected Cumulative Project Revenue
Total revenue earned by Contractor includes the Lump Sum and Variation
Order Revenue. The revenue accumulates over time (partial payments,
milestone payments etc). For simplicity it is calculated over timestep.
Expected Cumulative Project Revenue=
MIN(Expected Contracted Revenue Base,Project Lump Sum Price)
At each time step, the Expected cumulative revenue for accounting
purposes is the minimum of the Lump Sum and the Expected Revenue Base from
the contracted Hourly Rate.
Project Lump Sum Cost=
Break Even Hourly Rate*Current Work Week*Initial Completion Date*lnitial
Full Time Staff*Unit Lead Engineer
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Expected Cost of Project, calculated as a Lump Sum
Total Project Revenue=
Project Lump Sum Price+Expected Variation Order Revenue
VO Defect Fraction=
zidz(Defects in VO Tasks Submitted,Variation Orders Submitted)
~~ Defects/Tasks
Average number of defects per VO submitted
Expected Cost Accumulated to Contractor- INTEG (Expected Cost Accumulation
Rate,O)
~~ Total Anticipated Costs to date
Defects in VO approved for rework=
Variation Orders Approved as Rework Tasks*VO Defect Fraction
Defects/Week
Contracted Revenue Generation Rate=
Contracted Hourly Engineering Rate*Current Work Week*Initial Full Time
Staffi*Unit Lead Engineer*Finish Switch
~~ $/Week
Rate at which Contract revenue was expected to Accumulate
Expected Contracted Revenue Base= INTEG (Contracted Revenue Generation Rate,O)
Accumulating revenue to the contractor from agreed contract price
Expected Cost Accumulation Rate=
(Break Even Hourly Rate*Current Work Week*Initial Full Time Staff*Unit Lead
Engineer)*Finish Switch
~~ $/Week
Rate at which the Contractor expected costs to accumulate over the project
Expected Variation Order Revenue= INTEG (Variation Order Revenue Generation
Rate,O)
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Expected Revenue from VOs being approved and generating new tasks.
The formulation for the VO Effort Drain captures amount of VO work and the
engineering hours required.
Estimated Engineering Hours Required=
New Task Engineering Hours Required+Task Approval Engineering Hours
Required
engineer*hour
Estimate of initial Engineering Hours required to complete the Initial
Project Tasks
Defects being passed to rework=
"Tasks Not Approved, sent for Rework" *Average Defect Fraction
Defects/Week
Defects being passed to VO orders=
Average Defect Fraction* Variation order generation
~~ Defects/Week
Rate of defect flow
Defects in Tasks Being Reworked= INTEG (Defects being passed to rework+Defects in
VO approved for rework-Rework Defect rate,O)
Defects
Stock of defects in rework tasks (defects coflow)
Defects in Tasks Waiting Approval= INTEG (+Increase in Defects-decrease in
Defects+Rework Defect rate-Defects being passed to VO orders-Defects being passed to
rework,O)
Defects
~~ Stock of defects in tasks awaiting approval (coflow of defects)
Defects in VO Tasks Submitted= INTEG (Defects being passed to VO orders-Defects in
VO approved for rework,O)
~~ Defects
Stock of defects based on VO submission (defects coflow)
Total Work Remaining=
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Project Tasks to Do+Task Rework+Tasks Completed for Approval+Variation
Orders Submitted
Tasks
Total work left in the project to complete
Estimated Staff Required=
((Estimated Engineering Hours Required/"Task Define-Development Eng Hours
for Project Schedule")/Unit Lead Engineer)*(1+Initial Overhead Engineering fraction)
engineer
Initial estimated number of engineers based on # tasks, time spent on
integration, estimated error rates and required completion date. Task time
and productivity based on time to do an initial task. No inclusion of
estimates of approval time. This corresponds with personal anecdotal
evidence.
Preferred Return Hourly rate=
100
~ $/(engineer*hour)
~~ The desired rate to deliver the return expected by shareholders
decrease in Defects=
(Task Approval Rate)*Average Defect Fraction
Defects/Week
Break Even Hourly Rate=
70
~ $/(engineer*hour)
The hourly rate required to cover the overheads, plant, facilities,
vessels, debt repayments etc required by the contacting firm.
"Task Define-Development Eng Hours for Project Schedule"=
Initial Completion Date*Normal Work Week*(l-Ideal Fraction Time on
Integration)
hour/engineer
This is the number of engineering hours available (per unit engineer) for
the project duration at 40 hours per week less the time spent on
integration.
New Task Engineering Hours Required=
Estimated Initial Work/Normal Task Productivity
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~~ engineer*hour
Engineering hours required to complete designs of the initial tasks
Project Tasks to Do= INTEG (-Task Completion Rate+"V.O New Task Generation
Rate",Initial Project Tasks)
Tasks
Tasks the constitute the project
Increase in Defects=
Task Completion Rate*New Work Defects Fraction
Defects/Week
Rate at which defects flow into the stock of defects awaiting approval
Contracted Hourly Engineering Rate=
Margin Accepted on Contract*Preferred Return Hourly rate
$/engineer/hour
Rate at which engineers are billed to the project Sponsor
Cost Accumulation Rate=
(Current Work Week*Break Even Hourly Rate*Unit Lead Engineer*Full Time
Staff)*Finish Switch
$/Week
Rate at which cost accumulates
Total Work=
Project Tasks to Do+Tasks Completed for Approval+Task Rework+Tasks
Completed+Variation Orders Submitted
Tasks
The total sum of all the tasks that exist in the system at any point in
time
Task Approval Engineering Hours Required=
Estimated Initial Work/Normal Approval Task Productivity
engineer*hour
Engineering hours required to approve the tasks
Margin Accepted on Contract=
0.6
~ Dmnl
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Multiplier applied to the Preferred Hourly rate to derive the rate used
for the Contacted Rate. This is a measure of the firms aggressiveness to win
the work. More aggressive means reducing this number below 1. i.e a less
than normal return in order to "win" the work.
Rework Defect rate=
Rework Defect Fraction per Rework Task*Tasks Rework Rate
Defects/Week
Normal Approval Task Productivity=
0.1
~ Tasks/(engineer*hour)
The % of Approval task completed per engineering hour spent. It takes
approximately a quarter of the time to approve a task that it does to first do it per
engineer.
Time to Update RI=
RI Effect Time
Week
Time to adjust the RI
Time to Update RI Decrease=
8
~ Week
When RI is decreasing the update time is shorter
RI Effect Time=
IF THEN ELSE( Indicated RI>Relationship Index , Time to Update RI Increase,
Time to Update RI Decrease)
Week
Time to adjust the RI
RI Perception Gap=
Indicated RI-Relationship Index
Dmnl
The gap between the currently indicated RI and the immediate effect of
the various pressure variables.
RI Update Rate=
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((RI Perception Gap/Time to Update RI)*SW Desire to Track RI)*Finish Switch
1/Week
Rate at which the RI is updated
Time to Update RI Increase=
16
~ Week
Acknowledgment of improving RI performance typically takes longer than
a worsening performance.
Variation Orders Approved as Rework Tasks=
Variation Order Approval rate*Finish Switch
Tasks/Week
Rate at which VOs are approved and move to the stock of rework tasks
"Tasks Not Approved, sent for Rework"=
(Tasks Not Approved*(1-Percent of Rework tasks submitted as VO Orders by
Contractor))*Finish Switch
Tasks/Week
Rate of tasks that are not approved being sent to rework.
"V.0 New Task Generation Rate"=
(Variation Order Approval rate*Percent of VOs requiring New Tasks)*Finish
Switch
Tasks/Week
The rate at which V.Os become tasks is the same rate at which they
become approved. i.e once approved they move into the stock of V.0. approved
as New Tasks
Tasks Not Approved=
MIN(Task Checking Capacity*Average Defect Fraction*defect to task ratio,
Work Capacity from Task Approval*Average Defect Fraction*defect to task ratio)
Tasks/Week
The rate at which tasks do not get approved based on the minimum of the
resource limit (Task Checking Capacity) or task limits (Work Capacity From
Task Approval) and the Average Defect Fraction
Variation order generation=
((Percent of Rework tasks submitted as VO Orders by Contractor*Tasks Not
Approved)*SW Desire to generate VO)*Finish Switch
137
Tasks/Week
The rate of VO generation as a function of rework rate and errors
Variation Order Approval rate=
Variation Orders Submitted/Time for Sponsor to Approve VO
Tasks/Week
Rate at which VOs are approved and move to the stock of rework tasks
Task Rework= INTEG (
"Tasks Not Approved, sent for Rework"-Tasks Rework Rate+Variation Orders
Approved as Rework Tasks,0)
Tasks
Tasks that require rework on account of having defects
Tasks Completed for Approval= INTEG (+Task Completion Rate-Task Approval Rate-
"Tasks Not Approved, sent for Rework"+Tasks Rework Rate-Variation order generation,
0)
Tasks
~~ Tasks that have been completed and are awaiting approval
Percent of VOs requiring New Tasks=
0.5
~ Dmnl
~~ Some VOs will require New Tasks to be defined (i.e work that was not
included in the original scope), whereas some VOs are requests for additional
resources/money to do rework tasks that have changed due to insufficient or
changing data.
Average Defect Fraction=
zidz(Defects in Tasks Waiting Approval,Tasks Completed for Approval)
Defects/Tasks
Average defect fraction is the total stock of defects awaiting approval
divided by the stock of tasks awaiting approval
Tasks Rework Rate=
(MIN(Rework Capacity from Rework tasks, Rework Task Capacity))*Finish
Switch
~~ Tasks/Week
The rate at which rework tasks get completed based on the minimum of
the resource limit or task limits
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Tasks Completed= INTEG (Task Approval Rate,O)
Tasks
Tasks that have been completed and approved as defect free
Task Approval Rate=
(MIN(Work Capacity from Task Approval*(1-Average Defect Fraction)*defect to
task ratio, Task Checking Capacity*(1-Average Defect Fraction)*defect to task
ratio))*Finish Switch
Tasks/Week
The rate at which tasks get approved based on the minimum of the
resource limit (task Checking Capacity) or task limits (Work Capacity From Task
Approval).
Variation Orders Submitted= INTEG (Variation order generation-Variation Orders
Approved as Rework Tasks,O)
Tasks
Stock of variation orders that have been submitted by the contractor.
Total Required Eng Hours to Generate VO Tasks=
(Variation Orders Submitted/Desired Time to Generate VO Task)/VO Task
Productivity
engineer*hour/Week
The total capacity of eng hours per week needed to generate the VO tasks
in the time desired
Actual Total Project Cost to Contractor-- INTEG (Cost Accumulation Rate,O)
Actual costs incurred by the contractor
Percent Tasks Completed=
zidz(Tasks Completed,Total Work)
Dmnl
Ratio of tasks completed against the total sum of work that exists
SW Defect Switch=
Dmnl
Switch to turn on defects
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VO Task generation engineers to Total Staff ratio=
Engineers Required to Generate VO Tasks/Full Time Staff
Dmnl
Ratio of staff employed to generate VO tasks to the overall staff
Percent VO of total work remaining=
Variation Orders Submitted/Total Work Remaining
Dmnl
Desired Full Time Staff Multiplier-
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Desired Staff Table(Sustained Schedule Pressure)
Dmnl
Multiplier that results from the effect of schedule pressure
Desired Time to Generate VO Task=
2
~ Week
Generating a variation order takes the contractor a finite time and
requires resources.
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Desired Staff Table(
[(0,0)-
(6,4)],(0,0.75),(0.432056,0.83908),(1,1),(1.46341,1.2069),(1.97909,1.58621),(\
2.4669,1.85057),(3,2),(4,2.1),(5,2. 1))
Dmnl
Table that captures the effect of schedule pressure on the need for extra
staff
VO Task Capacity=
Percent VO of total work remaining*Work Capacity from Full Time Resources
Tasks/Week
Work capacity dedicated to VO tasks
"Task Development-Define Capacity"=
Work Capacity from Full Time Resources-VO Generation Effort Drain
Tasks/Week
Capacity to carry out the non-VO tasks
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VO Generation Effort Drain=
Max(VO Task Capacity,VO Work Capacity from Engineers)
Tasks/Week
The actual drain on the overall work effort from VO order Generation
Engineers Required to Generate VO Tasks=
(Total Required Eng Hours to Generate VO Tasks/Current Work Week)/Unit
Lead Engineer
engineer
Given the number of VOs submitted, the desired time to turn these into
submissions (and hence generate revenue) and the standard productivity, the
number of engineers required to generate the Vo submissions can be calculated.
VO Work Capacity from Engineers=
Total Available Full Time Eng Hours*VO Task generation engineers to Total
Staff ratio*VO Task Productivity
Tasks/Week
Work Capacity calculated from the number of engineers required to
generate VO tasks
VO Task Productivity=
0.025
~ Tasks/(engineer*hour)
Variation order tasks are assumed to be similar to the standard project
tasks in terms of their requirement for staff and time (hence the same
productivity)
Task Completion Rate=
(MIN(Work Capacity from Tasks,New Task Capacity))*Finish Switch
Tasks/Week
The rate at which tasks get completed based on the minimum of the
resource limit or task limits
SW Desire to generate VO=
Dmnl
Switch to turn on VO generation process
Change in Perceived Completion Rate=
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((Indicated Completion Rate-Perceived Completion Rate)/Time to Adj
Completion Rate)*Finish Switch
Tasks/Week/Week
Rate at which the completion rate is updated
SW Desire to Track RI=
1
Dmnl
Switch to activate RI
SW Desire to update Schedule Pressure=
1
Dmnl
Switch to calculate Schedule Pressure
Finish Switch=
IF THEN ELSE(Percent Tasks Completed>0.99, 0, 1)
Dmnl
Switch to complete model run once 99% of tasks are completed
Change in desired Staff=
((Indicated Desired Full Time Staff-Desired Full Time Staff)/Time to Update
Desired Staff)*Finish Switch
engineer/Week
Rate at which the desired staff level is updated
Full Time Staff Hiring Rate=
((SW Desire to Hire Full Time Staff*Staff Gap/Time to Hire Full Time
Staff))*Finish Switch
engineer/Week
Rate at which staff are hired to meet the project's needs
Schedule Pressure Change Rate=
(((Schedule Pressure-Sustained Schedule Pressure)/Time to Average the Schedule
Pressure)*SW Desire to update Schedule Pressure)*Finish Switch
1/Week
~~ Schedule Pressure changes over time - this is the rate at which it is
averaged out over the project
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Indicated Desired Staff=
Desired Staff Multiplier
engineer
Fraction Time on Integration=
MIN(1, Ideal Fraction Time on Integration*Integration Time Multiplier From
Sched Pressure*Integration Time Multiplier from RI)
Dmnl
~~ The multipliers for Schedule Pressure and RI combine to influence the
amount of time invested in integration activities. The Ideal Fraction is
modified by the two multipliers.
Effect of RI on Integration Time(
[(0,0)-
(2,2)],(0,O),(0.5,0.5),(0.75,0.75),(0.85,0.85),(0.923547,0.912281),(0.996942,\
0.964912),(1.12538,1),(2,1))
Dmnl
This look-up function maps the effect of the RI (Relationship Index) on
the desire to invest time in integration activities.
Integration Time Multiplier from RI=
Effect of RI on Integration Time(Relationship Index)
Dmnl
Multiplier that results from the effects of the RI.
Actual Staff to Planned Staff Ratio=
Full Time Staff/Initial Full Time Staff
Dmnl
The ratio of actual staff to the expected staff has an impact on the
relationship between the sponsor and contractor. More staff than expected
leads to higher costs, lower margins etc. This impacts the relationship
Table for RI Impact on VO Submitted(
[(0,O)-(5,6)],(-0.0152905,5.92105),(0,4.5),(0.15,3),(0.25,2.5),(0.5,1.7),(0.8,1.2),(\
1,1 ),(1.2,0.8),(2.5,0.5),(5,0.5))
Dmnl
~~ This look-up function maps the effect of the RI on the number of VOs
submitted by the contractor
Benchmarked Defect Fraction=
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0.15
~ Defects/Tasks
Anticipated percentage of defects based on historical norms
SW Staff reduction based on Scale and synergy expectations=
1
Dmnl
Initial staff numbers are affected by an expectation of synergies and
scale if the project is large enough.
Current Work Week=
Normal Work Week
hour/Week/engineer
Normal work week is 40 hours
Relationship Index= INTEG (RI Update Rate,Initial RI)
Dmnl
A measure of the strength of the relationship between the contractor and
project sponsor
Estimated Initial Defect Fraction=
0.15
~ Defects/Tasks
Estimate of defects based on previous experience (0.15)
Estimated Initial Work=
Initial Project Tasks/(1-Estimated Initial Defect Fraction*defect to task ratio)
Tasks
An estimate of the initial work which calculates the total work given the
initial task list and an estimate of defects based on experience.
Expected Variation Orders=
Initial Project Tasks*Benchmarked Percentage of Rework Tasks that lead to
VO*Benchmarked Defect Fraction*defect to task ratio
Tasks
The expected number of variation orders given expected defect rates and
VO submission rates
Initial Overhead Engineering fraction=
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0.1
~ Dmnl
A rule of thumb applied to estimate the "extra" effort required over and
above the task completion effort associated with a project
Integration Time Multiplier From Sched Pressure=
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Integration Time(Sustained Schedule Pressure)
Dmnl
Multiplier that results from the effects of schedule pressure
defect to task ratio=
1
Tasks/Defects
Normalized at one defect per task
Benchmarked Percentage of Rework Tasks that lead to VO=
0.3
~ Dmnl
Percentage of rework tasks that typically result in variation order
submission. Based on historical norms.
Initial RI=
1
Dmnl
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Integration Time(
[(0,0)-
(5,2)],(0,1),(1 ,1),(1.15,0.973684),(1.33028,0.877193),(1.5,0.75),(2,0.5),(3,0.25\
),(4,0.25))
Dmnl
This look-up function maps the effect of schedule pressure on the time
invested in integration activities.
Anticipated Finish Date=
Elapsed Time in Project+Weeks to Complete at Current Rate
Week
The anticipated project finish date is based on time elapsed and weeks
remaining at the current completion rate
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Anticipated Lateness as a Fraction of Initial Completion Date=
Anticipated Lateness at Current Completion rate/Initial Completion Date
Dmnl
Lateness as a fraction of the overall project schedule. i.e 2 weeks late is
not a big deal in a 200 week project, but is a real problem in a 12 week project.
Anticipated Lateness at Current Completion rate=
Anticipated Finish Date-Initial Completion Date
Week
The anticipated lateness of the project is the difference between the
anticipated date and the initial project schedule
Approval Fraction=
Tasks Completed for Approval/Total Work Remaining
Dmnl
Completion Rate Evaluation Period=
Max(Elapsed Time in Project-Schedule Delay, 1)
Week
Period over which the schedule progress is evaluated. Accounts for the
fact that at the start of the project no work is expected to be completed
immediately
Completion Rate used to Calculate Weeks Remaining=
Perceived Completion Rate
Tasks/Week
The perceived rate is used to calculate how many weeks will be required
to finish the outstanding work
Current Desired Work Rate=
Total Work Remaining/Time Remaining
Tasks/Week
Work rate required based on work to be done and time remaining
Staff Gap=
Desired Full Time Staff-Full Time Staff
engineer
The gap between the current staff level and the desired staff
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Weeks to Complete at Current Rate=
Work Remaining/Completion Rate used to Calculate Weeks Remaining
Week
The weeks left to complete the project based on the perceived completion
rate
Task Rework Fraction=
Task Rework/Total Work Remaining
Dmnl
Sustained Schedule Pressure= INTEG (Schedule Pressure Change Rate, 1)
Dmnl
This is the schedule pressure as felt by contractor and project sponsor.
Desired Full Time Staff= INTEG (Change in desired Staff,Initial Full Time Staff)
engineer
~~ The desired staff to meet the project's needs
Desired Staff Multiplier--
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Staffing Table(Sustained Schedule Pressure)
Dmnl
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Staffing Table(
[(0,0)-(5,2)],(0,0.5),(0.5,0.7),(1,1),(1.25,1.1),(2,1.2),(3,1.25),(5,1.25))
Elapsed Time in Project=
Time
Week
~~ Time counter for the weeks progressing
Task Checking Capacity=
Task Completion Capacity*Approval Fraction
Tasks/Week
~~ Total task capacity is split proportionally to Checking Tasks based on %
of Checking Tasks remaining
Task Completion Capacity=
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"Task Development-Define Capacity"*( 1-Fraction Time on Integration)
Tasks/Week
This is the available capacity to do work once time for integration
activities is subtracted
Task Integration Capacity=
"Task Development-Define Capacity" *(Fraction Time on Integration)
Tasks/Week
The Task Integration Capacity is the amount of engineering hours devoted
to integration activities which delivers a capacity measured in tasks/week..
Time to Update Desired Staff=
8
~ Week
Management takes time to update their estimates of the staff required
during the project
Indicated Schedule Pressure=
Task Schedule Pressure*(Current Desired Work Rate/Normal Work Rate)
Dmnl
Modifies the task schedule pressure (how much has done of what was
supposed to be done) with the amount of time left to do the remaining tasks
New Task Work Fraction=
Project Tasks to Do/Total Work Remaining
Dmnl
Time to Average the Schedule Pressure=
4
~ Week
Schedule pressure is calculated over a number of weeks to smooth for
discrete events and transient noise.
Schedule Pressure=
1+Anticipated Lateness as a Fraction of Initial Completion Date
Dmnl
Schedule pressure is based on the percent lateness.
Ideal Fraction Time on Integration=
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0.4
~ Dmnl
~~ Initial percent of time expected to be spent on integration activities
Rework Task Capacity=
Task Completion Capacity*Task Rework Fraction
Tasks/Week
Total task capacity is split proportionally to Rework Tasks based on % of
Rework Tasks remaining
Schedule Delay=
6
~ Week
Time lapse before work is expected to be completed and the completion
rate is calculated
Time to Adj Completion Rate=
16
~ Week
Evaluating the completion rate takes time and is done in increments
Task Schedule Pressure=
XIDZ(Task Completion Schedule, Tasks Completed, 1)
1
~~ Ratio of scheduled task completion to actual task completion
New Task Capacity=
Task Completion Capacity*New Task Work Fraction
Tasks/Week
Total task capacity is split proportionally to New Tasks based on % of
New Tasks remaining
Perceived Completion Rate= INTEG (Change in Perceived Completion Rate, Initial
Desired Work Rate)
Tasks/Week
~~ The perceived completion rate
Work Remaining=
Initial Project Tasks-Tasks Completed
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Tasks
The outstanding work is nominally the initial tasks minus the tasks
completed
Scheduled Percent total work completed=
(Task Completion Schedule/Initial Project Tasks)* 100
~1
Scheduled % completed of project
Task Completion Schedule=
MIN(Initial Project Tasks, Initial Desired Work Rate*Time)
Tasks
Tasks completed as the project moves forward
Normal Work Rate=
"Task Development-Define Capacity"
Tasks/Week
Normal (average) work rate based on normal work week, design staff
levels and time per task
Time Remaining=
Max(Initial Completion Date-Time,TIME STEP)
Week
Initial Completion Date=
100
~ Week
Initial scheduled project completion date
Table for Pressure Modifier(
[(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,0),(0.0703364,0.0482456),(0.152905,0.131579),(0.189602,0.254386),(0.229358
,0.385965),(0.25,0.5),(0.275229,0.627193),(0.318043,0.776316),(0.351682,0.890
351),(0.412844,0.964912),(0.5,1),(0.75,1),(1,1))
Dmnl
Pressure Modifier--
Table for Pressure Modifier(Scheduled Percent total work completed/100)
Dmnl
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Modifier that transfers the schedule pressure from initial to emergent
over the course of the project
Initial Schedule Pressure=
MIN(1,Initial Desired Work Rate/Normal Work Rate)
Dmnl
Initial schedule pressure based upon initial required work rate and the
normal work rate
Realized Schedule Pressure=
((1-Pressure Modifier)*Initial Schedule Pressure)+(Pressure Modifier* Indicated
Schedule Pressure)
Dmnl
Schedule pressure developed as a function of the initial schedule pressure
and the emergent pressure during the project
Initial Desired Work Rate=
Initial Project Tasks/Initial Completion Date
Tasks/Week
Initial Scheduled Work Rate based on tasks and initial schedule
Rework Defect Fraction per Rework Task=
New Work Defects Fraction*0.25
~~ Defects/Tasks
Rework tasks are assumed to have lower defect rates as they have already
been through the checking process once and are therefore in the process of
correcting the defects. There still exists some level of defects though.
Time for Sponsor to Approve VO=
12
~ Week
Variation orders have to be approved by the project sponsor before they
are acted on. This takes a finite time.
Rework Capacity from Rework tasks=
Task Rework/Minimum Time per Rework Task
Tasks/Week
~~ Capacity to complete the rework tasks based on total rework tasks and the
minimum time per task (sets an upper bound based on infinite resources i.e
reflects the physical constraints of the tasks themselves.)
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Mimimum Time per Task Approval=
3
~ Week
Minimum time in which a task can be approved given infinite resources.
Minimum Time per Rework Task=
2
~ Week
Minimum time in which a rework task can be completed given infinite
resources.
Initial Project Tasks=
1000
~ Tasks
Initial number of tasks to be completed on the project
Minimum Time per Task=
1
Week
Minimum time in which a task can be completed given infinite resources.
Table for Integration Multiplier on Defects(
[(0,0)-(1,2)],(0,0.6),(0.25,0.88),(0.4,1),(0.5,1.05),(0.75,1.1),(1,1.15))
Dmnl
This look-up function maps the effect that time spent on integration has
on the percentage of tasks completed correctly. More time on integration
results in fewer defects.
Work Capacity from Tasks=
Project Tasks to Do/Minimum Time per Task
Tasks/Week
Capacity to complete the tasks based on total tasks and the minimum time
per task (sets an upper bound based on infinite resources i.e reflects the
physical constraints of the tasks themselves.)
Work Capacity from Task Approval=
Tasks Completed for Approval/Mimimum Time per Task Approval
~~ Tasks/Week
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Capacity to complete the tasks based on total tasks and the minimum time
per task (sets an upper bound based on infinite resources i.e reflects the
physical constraints of the tasks themselves.)
SW Desire to Hire Full Time Staff=
Dmnl
The switch that allows hiring decisions to be made
Normal Work Week=
40
~ hour/Week/engineer
Normal hours per week, set at 40 hours
Unit Lead Engineer-
I
engineer
Time to Hire Full Time Staff=
12
~ Week
Hiring staff takes a finite time as requests are placed with HR, engineers
located, transferred or hired into the project.
Work Capacity from Full Time Resources=
Normal Task Productivity*Total Available Full Time Eng Hours
Tasks/Week
The total capacity to do work based on normal productivity and the
available engineers.
Normal Task Productivity=
0.025
~ Tasks/engineer/hour
The productivity for an engineer working on a standard task. Based on
completing 1 task per week (40 hours) of week.
Total Available Full Time Eng Hours=
Current Work Week*Full Time Staff*Unit Lead Engineer
engineer*hour/Week
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The total available engineering hours is based on the available engineers
and the current work week
New tasks=
0
- task/Week
Fraction of tasks with errors=
0.1
~ Dmnl
Time to complete tasks=
Week
Time to rework the task=
2
~ Week
Project Staff Additions=
"Project Staffing Constraint(Gap)"/Resource Addition Time
~~ Engineers/Week
Engineers devoted to Project= INTEG (Project Staff Additions-Project Staff reduction,
0)
~ Engineers
Project Staff reduction=
0
~ Engineers/Week
"Project Staffing Constraint(Gap)"=
Required Engineers on Project -Engineers devoted to Project
Engineers
Required Engineers on Project=
Initial Required Resources*Input
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Engineers
Initial Required Resources=
100
- Engineers
Input=
1+STEP(Step Height,Step Time)
Dmnl
Resource Addition Time=
8
~ Week
Step Height=
0.5
~ Dmnl
Step Time=
40
~ Week
Use of External Contract Resources=
Dmnl
.Control
Simulation Control Parameters
FINAL TIME =250
Week
The final time for the simulation.
INITIAL TIME = 0
Week
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The initial time for the simulation.
SAVEPER
TIME STEP
Week [0,?]
The frequency with which output is stored.
TIME STEP = 0.125
Week [0,?]
The time step for the simulation.
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Appendix B: Model Simulation Files
!This file tests the model for agreed contract price variations, from
!$60/eng*hr to $130/eng*hr. Switches are controlled from the model
!environment.
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 100
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.9
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 90
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.8
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 80
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.7
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 70
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 60
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=l.l
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 110
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.2
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 120
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 130
MENU>RUNIo
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!Sponsors Paradise: This file tests the model for agreed contract price
!variations, from $60/eng*hr to $130/eng*hr. The agreed price has no
!(direct)impact on the number of VOs submitted, the initial staff
!numbers, or on-going hiring
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 100
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.9
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 90
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.8
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 80
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.7
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 70
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 60
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
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SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 110
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.2
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=O
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=O
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 120
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 130
MENU>RUNIo
!Variation Orders are a Reality: This file tests the model for agreed
!contract price variations, from $60/eng*hr to $130/eng*hr. The agreed
!price impacts the number of VOs submitted, but does not effect the
!initial staff numbers, or on-going hiring
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 100
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.9
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 90
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.8
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 80
MENU>RUN o
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SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.7
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 70
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 60
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 110
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.2
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 120
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=0
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 130
MENU>RUN o
!A Smaller team will get it done: This file tests the model for agreed
!contract price variations, from $60/eng*hr !to $130/eng*hr. The agreed
!price impacts the number of VOs submitted and the initial staff
!numbers, but does not effect on-going hiring
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
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SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=l
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 100
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.9
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=l
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 90
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.8
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 80
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.7
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 70
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 60
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 110
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.2
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 120
MENU>RUN o
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SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=0
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 130
MENU>RUNIo
!People Cost money: This file tests the model for agreed contract price
!variations, from $60/eng*hr !to $130/eng*hr. The agreed price impacts
!the number of VOs submitted, the initial staff numbers and the on-
!going hiring.
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=l
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 100
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.9
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=l
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 90
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.8
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=l
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 80
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.7
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 70
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
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SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=l
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 60
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 110
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.2
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=l
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 120
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=l
SIMULATE>SETVALISW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 130
MENU>RUN o
!This file tests the model for sensitivity to variations in the VO mark
!up rate. Three agreed contract prices are simulated and each is then
!tested at different mark up rates.
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALIVariation Order Mark Up=1.1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 60, Mark Up 1.1
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALIVariation Order Mark Up=1.25
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 60, Mark Up 1.25
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALIVariation Order Mark Up=1.4
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 60, Mark Up 1.4
MENU>RUN o
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SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALIVariation Order Mark Up=1.1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 100, Mark Up 1.1
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALIVariation Order Mark Up=1.25
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 100, Mark Up 1.25
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALIVariation Order Mark Up=1.4
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 100, Mark Up 1.4
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALIVariation Order Mark Up=1.1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 130, Mark Up 1.1
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALIVariation Order Mark Up=1.25
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 130, Mark Up 1.25
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALIVariation Order Mark Up=1.4
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin on 130, Mark Up 1.4
MENU>RUNIo
!This file tests the model sensitivity to VO Approval Time.
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=16
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 60 Time 16wks
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
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SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=12
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 60 Time 12wks
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=8
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 60 Time 8wks
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=4
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 60 Time 4wks
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=l
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=16
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 100 Time 16wks
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=l
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=12
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 100 Time 12wks
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALI~nitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=8
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 100 Time 8wks
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=4
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 100 Time 4wks
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=16
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 130 Time 16wks
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
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SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=12
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 130 Time 12wks
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=8
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 130 Time 8wks
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALITime for Sponsor to Approve VO=4
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 130 Time 4wks
MENU>RUN o
!Ideal integration Time - varied from 0.1 to 0.5. This simulation tests
!the model sensitivity to variation in the ideal fraction time spent on
!integration. Can be thought of as a proxy for system complexity.
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALIIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 60 Int Fraction 0.1
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALIIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.2
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 60 Int Fraction 0.2
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVAL Margin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALlIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.3
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 60 Int Fraction 0.3
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVALIldeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.4
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 60 Int Fraction 0.4
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=0.6
SIMULATE>SETVAL|Ideal Fraction Time on Integration=0.5
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 60 Int Fraction 0.5
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MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALIIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 100 Int Fraction 0.1
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALIIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.2
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 100 Int Fraction 0.2
MENU>RUN o
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALIIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.3
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 100 Int Fraction 0.3
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALIIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.4
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 100 Int Fraction 0.4
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVAL Initial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1
SIMULATE>SETVALI~deal Fraction Time on Integration=0.5
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 100 Int Fraction 0.5
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALI~deal Fraction Time on Integration=0.1
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 130 Int Fraction 0.1
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALITnitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALITnitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.2
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 130 Int Fraction 0.2
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALIInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.3
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SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 130 Int Fraction 0.3
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALjIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.4
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 130 Int Fraction 0.4
MENU>RUNIo
SIMULATE>SETVALInitial Project Tasks=1000
SIMULATE>SETVALlInitial Completion Date=100
SIMULATE>SETVALIMargin Accepted on Contract=1.3
SIMULATE>SETVALIIdeal Fraction Time on Integration=0.5
SIMULATE>RUNNAMEIMargin 130 Int Fraction 0.5
MENU>RUNIo
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Appendix C: Model Optimization Results
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Model Optimization: "Project Sponsor Cost"
Sorted Parameter Sensitivities
Parameters are changed by +- 50%, if 0 by +- 0.5
PARAMETER -0.5 0.5
Normal Task Productivity=0.025 -2.46E+09 9.46E+08
Initial Project Tasks=1 000 2.14E+09 -2.14E+09
Preferred Return Hourly rate=100 2.14E+09 -2.14E+09
Typical New Task Correct Fraction=0.85 -1.90E+09 1.90E+09
SW Desire to generate VO=1 1.24E+09 -1.57E+09
Margin Accepted on Contract=1 1.39E+09 -9.61 E+08
SW Defect Switch=1 1.01E+09 -1.13E+09
VO Task Productivity=0.025 -1.06E+09 4.49E+08
SW TCA Sched Press=0 -1.05E+09 9.63E+08
Desired Time to Generate VO Task=2 -1.02E+09 4.OOE+08
SW Switch for RI effect on VO Submitted=1 8.73E+08 8.73E+08
Benchmarked Percentage of Rework Tasks that lead to VO=0.3 7.48E+08 -6.55E+08
Time for Sponsor to Approve VO=12 6.97E+08 -5.83E+08
SW Staff reduction based on Scale and synergy expectations=1 3.34E+07 6.62E+08
SW Project Profit Switch=1 -6.41 E+08 4.80E+08
Ideal Fraction Time on Integration=0.4 3.85E+08 -5.83E+08
Variation Order Mark Up=1.5 4.49E+08 -5.76E+08
SW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1 -4.82E+08 -4.82E+08
defect to task ratio=1 -1.19E+08 4.02E+08
SW VO Ratio Impact on RI=1 3.42E+08 3.42E+08
Initial Completion Date=100 -3.04E+08 2.27E+08
Normal Approval Task Prod uctivity=0.1 -2.89E+08 1 .17E+08
Schedule Delay=6 -1.32E+08 1.95E+08
SW Delay Penalty Switch=0 1.93E+08 -1.93E+08
SW Desire to Track RI=1 1.77E+08 -6.03E+07
Estimated Initial Defect Fraction=0.15 1.45E+08 -1.54E+08
Time to Adj Completion Rate=16 -1.29E+08 1.16E+08
Benchmarked Defect Fraction=0.15 -1.20E+08 1.12E+08
Time to Update RI Decrease=8 -9.33E+07 9.17E+07
Initial Overhead Engineering fraction=0.1 7.79E+07 -7.21 E+07
Initial RI=1 -6.28E+07 1.84E+07
Percent of VOs requiring New Tasks=0.5 5.32E+07 -5.19E+07
Time to Hire Full Time Staff=12 2.06E+07 -1.07E+07
SW Desire to update Schedule Pressure=1 2.04E+07 -6.53E+06
Time to Update Desired Staff=8 1.69E+07 -9.83E+06
SW Desire to Hire Full Time Staff=1 -1.45E+07 1.23E+07
Time to Average the Schedule Pressure=4 -8.92E+06 9.19E+06
Mimimum Time per Task Approval=3 1.27E+06 5.83E+06
Minimum Time per Rework Task=2 4.23E+06 -1.90E+06
SW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=1 4.13E+06 4.13E+06
Time to Update RI Increase=16 2.37E+06 -3.03E+06
Minimum Time per Task=1 -10820.3 -695541
Break Even Hourly Rate=70 0 -855.25
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Unit Lead Engineer=1
Normal Work Week=40
Use of External Contract Resources=1
Time to rework the task=2
Time to complete tasks=1
SW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
Step Time=40
Step Height=0.5
Resource Addition Time=8
Project Staff reduction=0
New tasks=0
Initial Required Resources=100
Fraction of tasks with errors=0.1
Delay Cost=200000
0 -221.625
0 -167.75
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Model Optimization: "Variation Order Generation"
Sorted Parameter Sensitivities
Parameters are changed by +- 50%, if 0 by +- 0.5
PARAMETER -0.5 0.5
Typical New Task Correct Fraction=0.85 230.661 -1633.71
SW Desire to generate VO=1 -310.569 262.365
SW Switch for RI effect on VO Submitted=1 -273.675 -273.675
SW Defect Switch=1 -235.396 193.808
Initial Project Tasks=1000 -211.358 211.358
Benchmarked Percentage of Rework Tasks -192.217 126.607
that lead to VO=0.3
Margin Accepted on Contract=0.6 -182.043 -119.571
SW Staff reduction based on Scale and -155.689 -41.368
synergy expectations=1
SW Switch for Profit effect on VO 139.943 139.943
submitted=1
SW TCA Sched Press=0 11.0507 -128.731
SW Project Profit Switch=1 58.7299 -88.1255
SW VO Ratio Impact on RI=1 -82.8742 -82.8742
Initial Completion Date=100 -64.4412 -72.9238
Desired Time to Generate VO Task=2 -70.9223 36.0084
VO Task Productivity=0.025 -70.6006 37.0826
SW Price impact on Initial Staff=1 -65.5789 -65.5789
Variation Order Mark Up=1.5 64.4295 -42.2493
Time for Sponsor to Approve VO=12 58.2503 -29.5282
Ideal Fraction Time on Integration=0.4 -22.0112 -55.0032
defect to task ratio=1 -47.1073 -52.7242
Normal Task Productivity=0.025 40.136 -52.5669
Percent of VOs requiring New Tasks=0.5 -31.9855 31.1586
SW Desire to Track RI=1 -22.6819 5.77131
Time to Adj Completion Rate=16 16.92 -15.8786
Normal Approval Task Productivity=0.1 -15.54 3.11434
SW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=1 -12.6147 -12.6147
Time to Update RI Decrease=8 10.1783 -11.8657
Benchmarked Defect Fraction=0.15 6.87035 -11.0281
Schedule Delay=6 5.37613 -7.66598
Estimated Initial Defect Fraction=0.15 3.1908 -6.77469
Initial RI=1 5.78076 -1.79332
SW Desire to update Schedule Pressure=1 -4.48593 1.70088
Initial Overhead Engineering fraction=0.1 2.64889 -3.02532
Time to Average the Schedule Pressure=4 2.59912 -2.34907
Time to Update RI Increase=16 -1.99793 1.56283
Time to Hire Full Time Staff=12 -1.93754 0.745748
Time to Update Desired Staff=8 -1.45486 0.793763
SW Desire to Hire Full Time Staff=1 0.771964 -1.11971
Mimimum Time per Task Approval=3 -0.114434 0.0819493
Minimum Time per Rework Task=2 -0.0689198 0.111334
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Minimum Time per Task=1
Break Even Hourly Rate=70
Preferred Return Hourly rate=100
Unit Lead Engineer=1
Normal Work Week=40
Use of External Contract Resources=1
Time to rework the task=2
Time to complete tasks=1
SW Delay Penalty Switch=0
Step Time=40
Step Height=0.5
Resource Addition Time=8
Project Staff reduction=0
New tasks=0
Initial Required Resources=100
Fraction of tasks with errors=0.1
Delay Cost=200000
8.53E-06 -0.0218723
0 0.0002982
83
0 0.0001896
06
0 5.02E-05
0 2.62E-05
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Model Optimization: "Expected Variation
Order Revenue"
Sorted Parameter Sensitivities
Parameters are changed by +- 50%, if 0 by +- 0.5
PARAMETER -0.5 0.5
Typical New Task Correct Fraction=0.85 6.71 E+08 -2.14E+09
VO Task Productivity=0.025 1.44E+09 -5.77E+08
SW Desire to generate VO=1 -1.24E+09 6.97E+08
Margin Accepted on Contract=0.6 -1.09E+09 -8.32E+07
SW Switch for RI effect on VO Submitted=1 -1.04E+09 -1.04E+09
SW Staff reduction based on Scale and synergy expectations=1 -9.13E+08 2.01E+08
Preferred Return Hourly rate=100 -9.1OE+08 9.1OE+08
Initial Project Tasks=1000 -9.1OE+08 9.1OE+08
Variation Order Mark Up=1.5 -8.85E+08 7.56E+08
SW Defect Switch=1 -8.51 E+08 4.98E+08
Desired Time to Generate VO Task=2 8.09E+08 -4.20E+08
SW TCA Sched Press=0 -3.85E+08 -8.03E+08
Initial Completion Date=100 7.67E+08 -5.51E+08
Benchmarked Percentage of Rework Tasks that lead to VO=0.3 -6.91 E+08 2.63E+08
Time for Sponsor to Approve VO=12 -6.52E+08 4.01E+08
defect to task ratio=1 -4.63E+08 2.79E+07
SW Project Profit Switch=1 -3.35E+08 -2.05E+08
Ideal Fraction Time on Integration=0.4 -3.14E+08 1.49E+08
SW VO Ratio Impact on RI=1 -2.04E+08 -2.04E+08
SW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1 1.73E+08 1.73E+08
Normal Approval Task Productivity=0.1 1.55E+08 -8.63E+07
SW Price impact on Initial Staff=1 1.48E+08 1.48E+08
Time to Adj Completion Rate=16 1.30E+08 -1.17E+08
Normal Task Productivity=0.025 -1.16E+08 -3.50E+07
SW Desire to Track RI=1 -1.10E+08 3.43E+07
Estimated Initial Defect Fraction=0.15 -1.07E+08 9.30E+07
SW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=1 1.06E+08 1.06E+08
SW Desire to Hire Full Time Staff=1 -7.10E+07 2.29E+07
Initial Overhead Engineering fraction=0.1 -5.73E+07 4.85E+07
Time to Update RI Decrease=8 5.27E+07 -5.60E+07
Initial RI=1 4.94E+07 -1.45E+07
Schedule Delay=6 3.06E+07 -4.82E+07
SW Desire to update Schedule Pressure=1 -4.24E+07 1.63E+07
Time to Hire Full Time Staff=12 3.39E+07 -3.55E+07
Benchmarked Defect Fraction=0.15 2.51 E+07 -3.49E+07
Time to Average the Schedule Pressure=4 2.50E+07 -2.23E+07
Time to Update Desired Staff=8 2.30E+07 -2.41E+07
Percent of VOs requiring New Tasks=0.5 -1.71E+07 4.41E+06
Time to Update RI Increase=16 -2.64E+06 1.91 E+06
Mimimum Time per Task Approval=3 463973 -2.39E+06
Minimum Time per Rework Task=2 -255717 -168663
Minimum Time per Task=1 0 -12520.8
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Break Even Hourly Rate=70 0 -384.454
Unit Lead Engineer=1 0 -170.126
Normal Work Week=40 0 -170.067
Use of External Contract Resources=1 0 0
Time to rework the task=2 0 0
Time to complete tasks=1 0 0
SW Delay Penalty Switch=0 0 0
Step Time=40 0 0
Step Height=0.5 0 0
Resource Addition Time=8 0 0
Project Staff reduction=0 0 0
New tasks=0 0 0
Initial Required Resources=100 0 0
Fraction of tasks with errors=0.1 0 0
Delay Cost=200000 0 0
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Model Optimization: "Variation Orders
Submitted"
Sorted Parameter Sensitivities
Parameters are changed by +- 50%, if 0 by +- 0.5
PARAMETER -0.5 0.5
Typical New Task Correct Fraction=0.85 4749.77 -156430
SW Desire to generate VO=1 -2711.98 4164.19
SW TCA Sched Press=0 2873.32 -1869.38
SW Defect Switch=1 -2028.5 2764.44
SW Project Profit Switch=1 2324.61 -1013.53
SW Switch for RI effect on VO Submitted=1 -1812.66 -1812.66
Initial Project Tasks=1000 -1784.42 1784.43
Ideal Fraction Time on Integration=0.4 852.138 -1626.32
Time for Sponsor to Approve VO=12 -1585.65 1284.63
Benchmarked Percentage of Rework Tasks that lead to VO=0.3 -1532.61 1520.3
SW Staff reduction based on Scale and synergy expectations=1 809.686 -1494.97
defect to task ratio=1 968.317 -1261.34
Margin Accepted on Contract=1 1211.92 -816.002
SW Switch for Profit effect on VO submitted=1 1203.79 1203.79
Normal Task Productivity=0.025 802.482 -541.404
SW VO Ratio Impact on RI=1 -775.751 -775.751
Initial Completion Date=100 -737.8 -71.7887
Normal Approval Task Prod uctivity=O.1 -630.643 182.416
VO Task Productivity=0.025 -570.49 264.144
Desired Time to Generate VO Task=2 -395.315 166.18
SW Desire to Track RI=1 -361.621 119.614
Schedule Delay=6 234.605 -355.558
Variation Order Mark Up=1.5 264.144 -318.428
Estimated Initial Defect Fraction=0.15 217.683 -291.163
Benchmarked Defect Fraction=0.15 260.804 -250.226
Time to Adj Completion Rate=16 200.859 -200.697
Time to Update RI Decrease=8 188.07 -191.808
Percent of VOs requiring New Tasks=0.5 -139.202 155.608
Initial Overhead Engineering fraction=0.1 126.255 -138.184
Initial RI=1 123.708 -36.7968
Mimimum Time per Task Approval=3 116.067 -106.37
Time to Hire Full Time Staff=12 -63.6652 36.2389
SW Desire to Hire Full Time Staff=1 61.05 -37.4666
Time to Update Desired Staff=8 -46.4544 33.2808
Minimum Time per Rework Task=2 32.3013 -44.2613
SW Desire to update Schedule Pressure=1 -22.4014 3.00442
SW Switch for Profit Multiplier on Hiring=1 -20.2256 -20.2256
Time to Average the Schedule Pressure=4 5.77388 -12.5488
Time to Update RI Increase=16 -9.36125 1.37604
Minimum Time per Task=1 0.243544 -5.87355
Preferred Return Hourly rate=100 0 0.007315
Break Even Hourly Rate=70 0 0.003632
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Unit Lead Engineer=1
Normal Work Week=40
Use of External Contract Resources=1
Time to rework the task=2
Time to complete tasks=1
SW Price impact on Initial Staff=1
SW Delay Penalty Switch=0
Step Time=40
Step Height=0.5
Resource Addition Time=8
Project Staff reduction=0
New tasks=0
Initial Required Resources=100
Fraction of tasks with errors=O.1
Delay Cost=200000
0 0.002453
0 0.001728
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
